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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates how a multinational enterprise’s (MNE) corporate 
headquarters governs its foreign subsidiaries. It draws on agency theory, prospect theory, 
and corporate governance literatures to develop a framework that describes select MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms expected to predict foreign subsidiary 
performance, measured as foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. 
To test this framework, I first conducted a pilot Canadian study. It was followed 
by the main multi-country study. The Canadian study used mixed methods. It analyzed 
quantitative data, compiled from different sources, and qualitative data, collected through 
personal interviews with subsidiary managers. The main multi-country study used 
survival analysis, multinomial logistic regression, and binary logistic regression 
techniques to perform various analyses on large longitudinal datasets and sub-datasets for 
the years 2000-2008 collected from a variety of sources.  
The Canadian study showed that Japanese MNE parents of Canadian foreign 
subsidiaries that had high survival likelihoods were governed through nonlinearly higher 
MNE parent ownership (increasing logarithmic relationship), the use of greater numbers 
of expatriates (increasing logarithmic relationship), and the adoption of lower levels of 
risk (decreasing s-shaped relationship), by their MNE corporate headquarters. 
The main multi-country study confirmed most of the findings of the Canadian 
study and provided new findings that demonstrated that foreign subsidiaries that were 
more likely to survive also tended to be governed by regional headquarters (RHQ) in 
addition to corporate headquarters (CHQ). It also showed that MNE parent ownership 
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and the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary interact with each other. They thus 
tend to complement and/or substitute for each other as MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance mechanisms predicting foreign subsidiary survival. Further, it showed that 
although these select MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms 
(ownership, expatriates, risk, and RHQ) predict a foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood, 
they do not predict a foreign subsidiary’s profitability. This suggests that the use of MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms may improve the survival but not 
necessarily the profits of foreign subsidiaries. Implications for agency theory, prospect 
theory, classical corporate governance, and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
research as well as implications for directors and managers are discussed. 
 
Keywords 
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance; parent-subsidiary governance; 
subsidiary governance; subsidiary control; agency theory; prospect theory; corporate 
governance; governance mechanisms; ownership; expatriates; risk; regional headquarters 
(RHQ); multi-method; mixed-method; performance; survival; profitability; interviews; 
Japan; Canada; multi-country; MNE; MNC. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International corporate governance (ICG) research has grown rapidly in recent 
decades (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). However, most research in this area focuses on 
comparing and contrasting governance systems across countries or regions  (Denis & 
McConnell, 2003). Yet, surprisingly limited attention has been given to MNE corporate 
governance and particularly the governance of foreign subsidiaries by their multinational 
parents (Luo, 2005) (for exceptions see Brellochs  (2007), Kim, Prescott, & Kim (2005), 
and Costello (2002)). 
MNEs dominate the global economy and are becoming ever more 
internationalized. Many foreign subsidiaries, although they may be wholly owned by 
their MNE parent, are themselves gigantic enterprises. For example, as of December 
2012, Toyota Motor, the world’s eighth largest company by revenues (265.7$b) on the 
Fortune Global 500 (Fortune, 2013), had 52 overseas manufacturing companies in 27 
countries and regions. It operated huge foreign subsidiaries in Canada, the U.S., Latin 
America, Europe, Russia, China and other countries. Thus shedding more light on MNE 
corporate governance practices and particularly on the governance of foreign subsidiaries 
by their MNE parents is both necessary and important (Luo, 2005; Starbuck, 2014). 
Senior consultants from the Entity Governance and Compliance team at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers observe that “Quite often when you look at corporate 
governance failings, they’ve occurred at the subsidiary level” (Gibson, Elsdon, & 
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Johnson, 2013). One recent example that illustrates this observation is the governance 
failure at Wal-Mart’s largest foreign subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico. During April 
2012, news broke that executives at Wal-Mart de Mexico had bribed Mexican authorities 
in previous years to ease expansion in that country and that executives at the company’s 
headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, had been alerted to the bribery but did not take 
action because of concerns about possible legal, reputational, and financial harm to the 
company (Barstow, 2012). Such examples suggest that poor MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance can threaten the performance of foreign subsidiaries and their 
MNE parents. 
Perhaps one of the most well-known recent cases that supports Gibson et al.’s 
(2013) observation is the 2010 MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance failure that 
contributed to BP’s Gulf of Mexico oil disaster and its ramifications on the performance 
of BP’s US subsidiary and the BP corporation as a whole (Tricker, 2012). BP’s Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill cost BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP’s Texas-based subsidiary 
responsible for Gulf of Mexico oil exploration and production, the death of 11 of its 
employees and the blowout of its Gulf of Mexico Macondo’s well. It also cost the BP 
corporation more than $4.5 billion in fines and penalties, the largest criminal resolution in 
U.S. history (Goldenberg & Rushe, 2012). Furthermore, it resulted in a downgrade in 
BP’s credit rating (Logendran, 2010) and a sharp decline in its stock price, a drop of 
around 50% in its share value in 50 days (Smith, 2011). In addition, on 25 June 2010 
BP’s shares reached a low of $26.97 per share costing BP a total loss of $100 billion in 
market value (Hays & Schnurr, 2010). 
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There is an abundance of research on classical (or domestic) corporate 
governance and international corporate governance (for literature reviews see Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella (2003b), Denis (2001), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Aguilera and 
Jackson (2010), Denis and McConnell (2003)). Moreover, there is an abundance of 
research linking classical corporate governance / international corporate governance and 
performance (e.g. Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); 
Renders, Gaeremynck, and Sercu (2010); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); 
Kaplan (1997); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Ho (2005)). In contrast, there is 
limited research on MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance (Luo, 2005) and there is 
virtually no research examining the impact of MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. This dissertation is an initial attempt to 
fill this gap in the literature. 
 
1.1. Purpose of this Dissertation 
This dissertation studies the phenomenon of MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance. It goes beyond studying the corporate governance structures of domestic 
companies or MNE-parents themselves, such as the parent’s ownership structure, the 
parent’s board structure, and the parent’s executive compensation structure, to study the 
corporate governance mechanisms between the MNE parent and its foreign subsidiaries 
and their impact on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. A foreign subsidiary 
company refers to a partially or wholly owned company that is 1) part of a larger 
corporation with headquarters in another country, and 2) incorporated under the laws of 
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the country it is located in (BusinessDictionary.com, 2014). Thus this thesis attempts to 
answer the following research questions: (1) how do MNE parents govern their foreign 
subsidiaries to ensure better performance measured as foreign subsidiary survival and 
foreign subsidiary profitability, and (2) why they govern these foreign subsidiaries that 
way. 
To answer these research questions this study starts with the MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance phenomenon then draws on agency theory (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986, 1992), classical corporate governance, and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
relationships literatures to develop a theoretical framework to help better explain this 
phenomenon. 
In developing this theoretical framework and deciding which MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance mechanisms would impact foreign subsidiary performance the 
most, I followed three steps. First I observed and scanned the broad classical corporate 
governance phenomena and landscape. Then I focused on internal classical corporate 
governance and its mechanisms. Finally I drew parallels between internal classical 
corporate governance mechanisms and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanisms to develop the theoretical model that I use to help better explain the parent-
subsidiary governance phenomenon. This process is described in more detail in the 
following three sections. 
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1.2. Definition and Landscape of Classical Corporate Governance 
Robert Tricker, the founder-editor of the research journal Corporate Governance: 
An International Review in 1993, defines corporate governance as “the way power is 
exercised over corporate entities. It covers the activities of the board and its relationships 
with the shareholders or members, and with those managing the enterprise, as well as 
with the external auditors, regulators, and other legitimate stakeholders [italics added] 
(Tricker, 2012: 4).” He adds that “Corporate governance is different from management. 
Executive management is responsible for running the enterprise, but the governing body 
ensures that it is running in the right direction and being run well. Directors are so-called 
because they are responsible for setting the organization’s direction, formulating strategy, 
and policymaking. Further, the board is responsible for supervising management and 
being accountable. Overall, the board is responsible for the organization’s decisions and 
its performance (Tricker, 2012: 4).” Based on his corporate governance definition, 
Tricker (2012: 32) then provides a schematic depiction of the classical corporate 
governance landscape and its participants (see Figure 1.1). 
Taking a closer look at Figure 1.1, one can divide the participants in the classical 
corporate governance space into internal classical corporate governance participants (i.e. 
participants internal to the domestic company) and external classical corporate 
governance participants (i.e. participants external to the domestic company). Internal 
classical corporate governance participants include shareholders, board of directors 
(BOD), and management. External classical corporate governance participants include 
stock markets for listed companies, finance markets (equity and debt), market 
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intermediaries, external auditors, contractual stakeholders (e.g. employees, suppliers, 
customers, etc.), government and other corporate regulators, media, and societal 
influence and other stakeholders. 
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Figure ‎1.1 Scope of Classical Corporate Governance 
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1.3. Internal Classical Corporate Governance Participants and Mechanisms 
Given that “central to corporate governance thinking and practice are the 
shareholders, the board of directors, and the management. [And that] …corporate 
governance codes focus on this set of players, as does much company law (Tricker, 2012: 
31)” and given that I believe that companies can shape their external circumstances 
through their internal behaviors, this thesis focuses on internal corporate governance 
participants and mechanisms as compared to external corporate governance participants 
and mechanisms. Generally in the internal classical corporate governance space, 
shareholders appoint board members to oversee the management of the company they 
own. Thus, shareholders mainly govern the company they own through their ownership-
level mechanism and through their other board-level mechanisms. The ownership-level 
mechanism refers to the ownership concentrations of the shareholders in the company 
they own. The board-level mechanisms include BOD special committees (e.g. risk 
committee, audit committee, compensation committee, nominating committee, 
governance committee, etc.), capital structure (e.g. debt, equity), organizational structure 
(e.g. functional structure, multidivisional structure (M-form structure), matrix structure, 
etc.), executive compensation (e.g. fixed/variable, money/shares/options, short/long term 
targets), employee participation, etc. 
Ownership, BOD, risk, and organizational structure are among the most important 
mechanisms used to govern companies. As a result, I focus on the ownership (i.e. 
ownership concentration), BOD, risk (i.e. risk committee and capital structure / debt 
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level), and organizational structure internal classical corporate governance mechanisms 
shown in Figure 1.2. 
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Shareholders 
Internal classical CG Mechanisms 
(Ownership & BOD): 
 Ownership concentration 
 BOD 
 Special Committees (Risk 
Committee) 
 Capital structure (debt, equity) 
 Organizational structure 
Management  Performance 
Figure 1.2 Focal Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
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1.4. MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Phenomenon, Definition, and 
Mechanisms 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance phenomenon, more particularly, how MNE parents govern their foreign 
subsidiaries to ensure better foreign subsidiary performance. To develop a framework 
that describes the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms expected to 
impact foreign subsidiary performance one has to define MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance before moving to the third previously mentioned step, drawing parallels 
between internal classical corporate governance mechanisms and MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance mechanisms. 
Luo (2005) defines MNE governance as “the system that not only monitors the 
relationship[s] between executives and stakeholders (including shareholders) but also 
directs … [an MNE’s] various globally dispersed businesses and pinpoints the 
distribution of power, rights and responsibilities among critical participants in the 
corporate-level [and subsidiary-level] decision-making process that affects worldwide 
corporate affairs [italics added]”. 
 Building on Luo’s definition, I define MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
as the system that directs and monitors the relationships between a foreign subsidiary and 
its stakeholders (among which the MNE parent is typically a major stakeholder / 
shareholder) and identifies the distribution of power, rights, and responsibilities among 
12 
 
 
key participants in the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary decision-making process that 
affects the MNE parent’s and foreign subsidiary’s affairs. 
Based on this definition, plus agency theory, prospect theory, and the previously 
discussed focal internal classical corporate governance mechanisms, I develop the MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance framework in Figure 1.3 that describes MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms that are parallel to the internal 
classical corporate governance mechanisms in Figure 1.2 and that are expected to impact 
foreign subsidiary performance. 
In Figure 1.3, ownership (which refers to the MNE parent’s ownership in the 
foreign subsidiary), expatriates (which refers to the expatriates in the foreign subsidiary), 
risk (which refers to the risk orientation of the foreign subsidiary), and regional 
headquarters (which refers to whether the foreign subsidiary is governed by a RHQ) are 
respectively parallel to ownership concentration, BOD, risk committee and capital 
structure, and organizational structure in Figure 1.2. In the case of expatriates and BOD, 
I consider them parallel because I consider individual expatriates as having a foreign 
subsidiary governance role similar to individual directors’ corporate governance role. 
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MNE Parent                
(as shareholder) 
MNE Parent-Foreign 
Subsidiary Governance 
Mechanisms 
Ownership 
Expatriates 
Risk 
Regional 
Headquarters 
Foreign Subsidiary 
Performance 
Figure 1.3 MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Mechanisms Studied in this Thesis 
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1.5. Agency Theory and Prospect Theory 
 Agency theory was used to select the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanisms expected to impact foreign subsidiary performance and to develop 
hypotheses relating these MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms to 
foreign subsidiary performance. To develop my hypotheses I use agency theory to argue 
that, relative to MNE parents with foreign subsidiaries that are less likely to survive, 
MNE parents with foreign subsidiaries that are more likely to survive, use higher 
ownership and expatriates and tend to use RHQ as MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance mechanisms. MNE parents use these governance mechanisms to align the 
interests, goals, and outcomes of their foreign subsidiaries with theirs to reduce parent 
(principal)-subsidiary (agent) agency problems, which are expected to increase their 
foreign subsidiaries survival. I also use agency theory to argue that although these MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms may impact foreign subsidiary 
survival, they may not necessarily predict subsidiary profitability. 
I draw on prospect theory to explain why risk orientation impacts foreign 
subsidiary survival but not necessarily foreign subsidiary profitability. I use prospect 
theory for three reasons. The first is to explain that firms follow three risk orientations, 
namely, extreme risk-averting orientation, moderate risk-taking orientation, and 
excessive risk-seeking orientation. The second is to argue that firms following the 
moderate risk-taking orientation are assumed to be rational actors whereas firms 
following the extreme risk-averting orientation and the excessive risk-seeking orientation 
15 
 
 
are assumed to be boundedly rational actors. The third is to argue that within each 
orientation some firms behave in an even more rational manner than their peers while 
others behave in an even more biased manner than their peers. More details about this are 
provided in the hypothesis development for risk orientation.  
 
1.6. Thesis Studies and Organization 
To answer the previously mentioned two research questions I conduct two studies, 
a pilot Canadian study and a main multi-country study. The pilot Canadian study utilizes 
a Canadian sample and analyzes the relationships between ownership, expatriates, and 
risk orientation (but not RHQ) relative to survival. This study follows a multi-method 
approach. To answer the first research question I gather archival data on the ownership, 
expatriates, and risk orientation mechanisms that Japanese MNEs use to govern their 
Canadian subsidiaries and build a survival model to test my hypotheses and present my 
quantitative results. To help answer the second research question I conduct interviews 
with Canadian subsidiary board members, CEOs, and top management team (TMT) 
members. I then analyze these interviews and present my qualitative results.  
The main multi-country study utilizes a multi-country sample and analyzes the 
relationships between ownership, expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ relative to 
survival and profitability. This study addresses the first research question using a very 
large sample of Japanese MNEs with foreign subsidiaries in a range of countries and 
regions. Here, I test the impact of the selected MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanisms on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. 
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I investigate the impact of MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanisms on both foreign subsidiary survival and foreign subsidiary profitability for 
several reasons. First, I believe that profitability tends to be a shorter term measure of 
performance while survival tends to be a longer term measure of performance. That is 
because in this thesis subsidiary profitability is conceptualized and measured as a 
subsidiary’s financial performance in a specific year whereas subsidiary survival is 
conceptualized and measured as, whether and for how long. a subsidiary survives over 
the years. 
Second, although Mitchell (1994) and Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell 
(1997) justify their use of survival as a performance measure based on its moderate 
correlation with subsidiary profitability, Makino and Beamish (1998) and Delios and 
Beamish (2001) show that these two performance measures are distinct and do not 
necessarily co-vary. Third, I want to compare the effect of MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance mechanisms on survival with their impact on profitability because 
I believe that these same governance mechanisms may predict foreign subsidiary survival 
but not necessarily foreign subsidiary profitability. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two develops the 
arguments for the six general hypotheses, related to ownership, expatriates, and risk 
orientation, that I test in the quantitative and qualitative pilot Canadian study. It also 
develops the arguments for two additional general hypotheses related to RHQ and an 
interaction hypothesis that I additionally test in the main multi-country study. 
Chapter Three includes the methods and results of the pilot Canadian study. 
Chapter Four includes the methods and results of the main multi-country study. Chapter 
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Five includes the discussion of the Canadian and multi-country studies. Table 1.1 
presents the different hypotheses that are considered in the pilot and main studies. 
 
Table ‎1.1 Hypotheses Considered in the Pilot and Main Studies 
 Pilot Canadian 
Study: Canadian 
sample with 
survival as 
dependent variable) 
Main Multi-Country 
Study: Global 
sample with survival 
and profitability as 
dependent variables) 
H1a: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary 
has a positive nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign 
subsidiary’s survival. 
  
H1b: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary 
has a negligible effect on that foreign subsidiary’s 
profitability. 
  
H2a: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a 
positive nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign 
subsidiary’s survival. 
  
H2b: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a 
negligible effect on its profitability. 
  
H3a: The relationship between parent risk orientation and 
foreign subsidiary survival is nonlinear (declining s-shaped), 
with the slope negative for parents with an extremely risk-
averse orientation, positive for parents with a moderate risk-
taking orientation, and negative for parents with an 
excessively risk-seeking orientation (see Figure 2.1). 
  
H3b: An MNE parent’s risk orientation has a negligible 
effect on its foreign subsidiary’s profitability. 
  
H4a: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional 
headquarters (RHQs) in the regions where these foreign 
subsidiaries operate are more likely to survive than their 
counterparts of parents without RHQs in the regions where 
they operate. 
  
H4b: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional 
headquarters (RHQs) in the regions where these foreign 
subsidiaries operate do not necessarily financially perform 
better than their counterparts of parents without RHQs in 
the regions where they operate. 
  
H5: Expatriates modify the effect of ownership on foreign 
subsidiary survival; the effect of MNE parent ownership on 
foreign subsidiary survival is stronger (weaker) when the 
number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is lower 
(higher). 
  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
With MNEs’ increasing internationalization and dominance in the global 
economy, it has become more pressing to study MNE governance in general and MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance in particular. However, despite its importance, 
MNE governance and MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance research was almost 
nonexistent before the 2000s (Delios, 2011). Furthermore, despite calls for papers on 
MNE governance (e.g. Delios, 2011; Luo, 2005; Rahman, 2011; Strange, Filatotchev, 
Buck, & Wright, 2009) research in these areas has grown only slowly since then, perhaps 
due to the limited availability of MNE governance data. What follows is a literature 
review of the few studies on MNE and foreign subsidiary governance. 
In a quantitative empirical study, Lippert and Rahman (1999) find that CEO 
compensation of domestic companies (DCs) is more aligned with equity performance 
than that of multinational corporations (MNCs). They further find that DCs and MNCs 
use corporate governance constructs and mechanisms differently. 
Kim et al. (2005) conceptually argue that MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance must respond to different levels of agency problems related to varying 
strategic roles of foreign subsidiaries. They further argue that varying governance 
structures for each foreign subsidiary leads to better overall MNE performance. 
Kiel, Hendry, and Nicholson (2006), also in a conceptual paper, propose four 
governance frameworks for subsidiary companies: (1) Direct Control, (2) Dual 
19 
 
 
Reporting, (3) Advisory Board, and (4) Local Board. They then provide 
recommendations on when each would lead to improved overall MNE performance. 
Brellochs (2007), in a qualitative PhD thesis based on agency theory’s 
predictions, finds that there are three categories of subsidiary governance mechanisms. 
He argues that the mechanisms in the categories aimed at reducing goal incongruence and 
managerial discretion are more important than those in the category aimed at decreasing 
information asymmetry. Furthermore, he finds that a subsidiary’s governance 
mechanisms are contingent on the subsidiary’s local environment and the MNE group 
that the subsidiary is part of. 
Finally, Costello and Costello (2010), in a quantitative empirical study, find that 
there are three types of subsidiary governance bundles, those that respectively depend on 
parent-centered governance mechanisms, subsidiary-centered governance mechanisms, 
and parent- and subsidiary- centered governance mechanisms. They argue that the 
MNE’s international strategy, its subsidiary’s importance, its subsidiary’s environmental 
uncertainty, and its subsidiary’s age are factors that help predict what type of subsidiary 
governance bundle an MNE will use to align the interests of its headquarters with those 
of a particular subsidiary. 
In this thesis I draw on agency theory following Filatotchev and Wright’s (2011) 
call for a greater focus on agency theory to understand corporate governance in MNEs. 
Most of the empirical literature on classical (domestic) corporate governance is grounded 
in agency theory and focuses on associating different corporate governance mechanisms 
with performance (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). This study extends agency theory to link 
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different MNE parent-subsidiary governance mechanisms with foreign subsidiary 
survival and profitability, a phenomenon that has been under-researched. 
Agency theory attempts to explain the agency problem, that is, the principal-agent 
problem, the agency relationship, the mitigation of the agency problem, and agency costs 
(Clarke, 2004; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It assumes that principals and agents are self-interested 
rational utility-maximizers and thus have divergent interests. The agency problem arises 
when agents pursue their self-interest at the expense of the maximization of the utility of 
their principals. The agency relationship is defined as the implicit or explicit contract 
under which the principal engages the agent to perform some service on his/her behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent (Clarke, 2004). 
To mitigate the agency problem, agency theory attempts to align the agent’s interests 
with those of the principal by analyzing the optimal contract form and the optimal 
governance structure (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The two most discussed agency problems are moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Moral hazard arises when the principal cannot observe or monitor the agent’s actions. 
Adverse selection arises when the principal cannot evaluate whether the agent’s actions 
are in the principal’s best interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). Fundamentally, the agency 
problem in general and the moral hazard and adverse selection problems in particular, are 
problems of information asymmetry (Shapiro, 2005). 
There are three broad types of agency costs: 1) “residual loss” (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b) refers to costs which represent the financial loss that the principal incurs when the 
agent pursues his/her self-interest at the principal’s expense, 2) monitoring costs refer to 
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costs that the principal incurs to decrease the aberrant activities of the agent, and 3) 
bonding costs refer to costs that the agent incurs to compensate the principal in case the 
agent acts in ways that harm the principal (Clarke, 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
Typically, the principal incurs monitoring costs to decrease the information asymmetry 
between himself/herself and the agent and thus minimize residual loss. Monitoring costs 
incurred by the principal are effective when they are less than the benefits gained from 
reducing residual loss. 
I extend agency theory to explain MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
relationships and their impact on the survival and profitability of foreign subsidiaries of 
MNE parents. MNE parent-foreign subsidiary relationships can be considered principal-
agent relationships since MNE parents (i.e. principals) delegate decision-making 
authority and responsibility to foreign subsidiaries (i.e. agents) (Nohria & Ghoshal, 
1994). Physical, legal, political, and other distances make it even more difficult for MNE 
parents than for domestic parents to observe and monitor their subsidiaries’ actions, let 
alone assess whether these actions are in these parents’ best interests (Gong, 2003); thus, 
exacerbating the adverse selection and moral hazard agency problems even more than in 
traditional domestic companies. 
I also draw on prospect theory to explain why and how the risk orientation MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanism impacts foreign subsidiary survival and 
profitability. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first proposed prospect theory to argue that 
the choices that individuals make in risky situations are not always consistent with the 
basic assumptions and predictions of the most commonly accepted economic theory of 
rational choice, namely the expected utility theory developed by Von Neumann and 
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Morgenstern (1944). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that, contrary to expected 
return theory’s principles, individuals are boundedly rational (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, 
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011) rather than perfectly rational and thus don’t always make 
perfectly rational decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) and that subjective  
probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) and framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 
1986) influence individuals’ decisions under risk. Moreover, they demonstrated that 
individuals’ use of decision heuristics lead to biases that impact their decisions (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974).  
They thus showed that how individuals interpret and frame their choices, as gains 
or as losses, influences how much risk they will take. For instance, they found that 
framing an investment decision as a loss (10% investment loss) will put someone in a 
domain of loss, and framing the same investment decision as a gain (90% investment 
profit) will put someone in a domain of gain. If an individual frames an outcome as a 
loss, (s)he will assume more risk to avoid that outcome than if (s)he framed the identical 
outcome as a gain. Therefore, prospect theory’s major insight is that people hate to lose 
even more than they love to win and that this will systematically bias their attitudes 
toward risk (Mercer, 2005). 
Subsequent researchers extended prospect theory’s ideas from the individual level 
to the firm level (for examples see: Bowman, 1982; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; 
Jegers, 1991). I extend these ideas even further to the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
level to explain the impact of risk orientation, a parent-subsidiary governance 
mechanism, on foreign subsidiary survival and profitability. 
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To govern their foreign subsidiaries, MNE parents can employ different MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms. In the following sections I explain 
how MNE headquarters use the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms 
of ownership, expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ to govern their foreign subsidiaries 
and impact their foreign subsidiaries’ performance. 
 
2.1. Ownership (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Mechanism) 
and Performance 
Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, and Certo (2010) note that “Firm ownership is an 
increasingly influential form of corporate governance.” Judge (2011) suggests that 
ownership plays a pivotal role in corporate governance. Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan 
(2003a) edited a Special Research Forum on Governance through Ownership to further 
research on ownership as a governance mechanism. Schaan (1983) shows that MNE 
parents can influence and control their foreign subsidiaries through the use of several 
control mechanisms. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) suggest that among the several used 
foreign subsidiary control mechanisms, the level of an MNE parent’s ownership in its 
foreign subsidiary is still generally considered one of the most important potential foreign 
subsidiary control and influence mechanisms. Therefore, I consider an MNE parent’s 
ownership in a foreign subsidiary as an important MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance mechanism. 
Ownership generally refers to “the right to exclusive use of an asset. The owner of 
an asset normally has the right to decide what use shall be made of it, and cannot be 
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deprived of it except by law. The state, however, claims the right to regulate the use of 
many assets, and to tax income derived from them” (Black, 1997, p. 340). In the MNE 
context, ownership refers to the MNE parent’s exclusive rights to use its shares (assets) in 
its foreign subsidiary. Two major ways MNE parents use their ownership in their foreign 
subsidiaries are as a strategic governance mechanism (Alces, 2008; Doz & Prahalad, 
1984; Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004) and a structural governance mechanism. 
I argue that MNE parent ownership in a foreign subsidiary has a positive effect on 
the survival of the foreign subsidiary but does not necessarily have an effect on the 
profitability of the foreign subsidiary. That is because generally an MNE-parent 
(principal) with higher ownership in a foreign subsidiary (agent) is expected to have more 
incentive and influence, than a counterpart with lower ownership, to minimize parent-
subsidiary agency costs and agency problems but may not necessarily be able to 
maximize foreign subsidiary revenues. Minimizing agency costs and agency problems 
consequently increases the survival likelihood but not necessarily the profitability of the 
foreign subsidiary. 
Classical corporate governance research suggests that concentrated owners, such 
as institutional investors and large block holders, have more incentive and influence to 
better monitor and govern their companies than their minority investor counterparts 
(Chakraborty & Sheikh, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This is because first they have a 
sufficiently larger investment at stake (Daily et al., 2003a) and second they cannot easily 
divest their sufficiently larger investment in a firm not meeting their performance 
expectations (Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998). Analogously, and for similar reasons, 
generally an MNE parent with a higher ownership concentration in its foreign subsidiary 
25 
 
 
is expected to have more incentive and influence to better monitor and govern its foreign 
subsidiary than a counterpart with a lower ownership concentration in its foreign 
subsidiary. However, having more incentive and influence to better govern its foreign 
subsidiary due to higher ownership, by no means suggests that an MNE parent with lower 
ownership in its foreign subsidiary cannot use other mechanisms to control its foreign 
subsidiary (Schaan, 1988). Thus my statement is understandably general and exceptions 
can be found. 
Investors (stockowners) typically have two basic ways to improve firm 
performance: exit and voice (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). MNE-
parents can also utilize these two ways to improve their foreign subsidiaries’ 
performance. For example, an MNE-parent can sell its shares (exit) in a certain 
subsidiary to indicate its dissatisfaction with the subsidiary’s management or their 
behavior. However, divesting a subsidiary is expensive because subsidiary shares are 
usually not publicly traded and thus quite illiquid, which makes selling them costly. 
Therefore, parents, with significant ownership in their subsidiaries, usually have more 
incentive to exercise their voice. Investors, generally exercise their voice through 
shareholder activism (Smith, 1996) by campaigning and voting in shareholder meetings. 
MNE-parents, on the other hand, exercise voice through closely monitoring and directing 
their foreign subsidiaries’ behavior. They exercise voice in at least three ways. The first is 
through the voting of foreign subsidiary board members, many of whom are usually 
MNE-parent managers, on the subsidiary’s strategies, budgets, and policies. The second 
is through assigning expatriates, who are expected to be loyal to the MNE-parent, as 
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foreign subsidiary general managers or top management team members. The third is 
through setting policies and procedures for their foreign subsidiaries to follow. 
I contend that an MNE-parent (principal) with higher ownership in a foreign 
subsidiary (agent) typically has more influence on directing and monitoring the purpose, 
goals, strategies, policies, and actions of the foreign subsidiary than a counterpart with 
lower ownership. With such influence the parent can restructure the subsidiary’s business 
activities or ownership or even change its charter (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) or 
influence managerial behavior (Connelly et al., 2010). In the event of restructuring, the 
parent can pursue financial, governance, operational, or ownership restructuring of the 
subsidiary. When changing a subsidiary’s charter, a parent can alter a subsidiary’s 
mandate (Roth & Morrison, 1992), responsibilities, business activities, markets served, 
products manufactured, technologies held, functional areas covered, or any combination 
thereof (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). While attempting to influence managerial behavior a 
parent can persuade, lobby, or sometimes even force subsidiary managers to follow 
certain courses of action. For instance, one of the participants interviewed for this study 
was a subsidiary governance senior officer at the headquarters of an MNE. He suggested 
that, at times, after making some acquisitions, the management of the MNE that he 
worked at had to ‘politely’ force the management of the acquired subsidiary to follow the 
acquirer’s policies and procedures. 
With more incentive to monitor its foreign subsidiary than to divest it and with 
more influence to monitor and direct the subsidiary’s behaviors, an MNE parent with 
higher ownership is more likely to reduce a subsidiary’s moral hazard and to align a 
subsidiary’s interests with the parent’s interests than would a counterpart with lower 
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ownership. A lower foreign subsidiary moral hazard and a greater alignment of the 
parent’s and the subsidiary’s interests will lower parent-subsidiary agency costs and 
minimizes their agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; O’Donnell, 2000). Fama 
and Jensen (1983b) argue that reducing agency problems significantly contributes to the 
survival of different organizational forms. Similarly, I argue that minimizing parent-
subsidiary agency problems considerably increases the survival likelihood of a subsidiary 
(Jensen, 1983). 
Greater MNE parent ownership in a foreign subsidiary is expected to increase the 
survival of the foreign subsidiary, although this ownership-survival relationship is 
anticipated to be nonlinear logarithmic. The latter is because, as parent ownership 
increases and agency problems decrease, subsidiary self-serving behaviors decline. 
However they decline at a decreasing rate, as increments in the ownership levels in the 
lower end will have a larger impact in reducing potential for subsidiary self-serving 
behavior, and thus agency costs, than similar ones at the higher end. Therefore I contend 
that the law of diminishing marginal utility is at work here. For example, Gomes-
Casseres (1990) notes that firms are likely to perceive a difference between 100 percent 
and 80 percent foreign ownership differently from a difference between 80 percent and 
60 percent foreign ownership. Applying the law of diminishing marginal utility, I argue 
that increments at lower ownership levels (e.g. from 0% to 51%) are more sensitive than 
similar increments at higher ownership levels (e.g. from 52% to 100%) (Dhanaraj & 
Beamish, 2004). 
Although I expect MNE parent ownership in a foreign subsidiary to have an effect 
on the survival of the foreign subsidiary, I do not expect it to necessarily have an effect 
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on the profitability of the foreign subsidiary for the following reasons. First, MNE parent 
ownership in a foreign subsidiary is expected to minimize MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
agency costs and agency problems that are in turn expected to increase foreign subsidiary 
survival. However, ownership is not expected to maximize foreign subsidiary revenues, 
which are essential for increasing foreign subsidiary profitability. That is because in 
classical corporate governance, investors typically do not manage the day-to-day affairs 
of their firms, but elect directors who appoint top managers to do so. However, investors 
usually interfere when their firm is facing a crisis or possible bankruptcy, which 
sometimes may be the result of agency problems, but they generally do not interfere to 
maximize their firm’s revenues, they let the board and management do this job (Lane et 
al., 1998). 
Second, a firm’s profitability is determined by its interaction with its product 
markets and its many factor markets, of which the capital markets are but one (Lane et 
al., 1998). Similarly, a foreign subsidiary’s profitability is determined by all these 
variables, of which its ownership structure is but one. Third, there is some evidence that 
ownership concentration and accounting measures of performance are independent 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) which suggests that foreign subsidiary ownership and 
profitability (financial performance) would probably be independent as well. Therefore I 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary has a positive 
nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign subsidiary’s survival. 
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Hypothesis 1b: An MNE parent’s ownership in a foreign subsidiary has a 
negligible effect on that foreign subsidiary’s profitability. 
 
2.2. Expatriates (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance Mechanism) 
and Performance 
I previously defined MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance as the system 
that directs and monitors the relationships between foreign subsidiaries and their 
stakeholders, among which the MNE parent is typically a major stakeholder. I view 
expatriates as an important MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanism. 
Many studies see expatriates as a key MNE parent-foreign subsidiary control mechanism 
(Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Fenwick, De Cieri, & Welch, 1999; Gong, 2003). Macedo-
Soares and Schubsky (2010) explicitly view expatriates as an effective MNE parent-
foreign subsidiary governance mechanism. Consistent with Macedo-Soares and 
Schubsky (2010) I consider expatriates as an MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanism. That is because I view control as analogous to only the monitoring 
dimension in my MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance definition whereas I view 
expatriates as also having an MNE parent-foreign subsidiary alignment role analogous to 
the directing dimension in my definition. Monitoring is defined as observation of an 
agent’s effort or outcomes that is accomplished through supervision, accounting controls, 
and other devices. Whereas, one way alignment of an agent’s and a principal’s interests 
can be achieved is through contracts that make the agent’s compensation contingent on 
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outcomes of his or her performance that are desired by the principal (Tosi, Katz, & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1997). 
Moreover, given that most foreign subsidiaries either do not have a board of 
directors or have an inactive symbolic one (Gillies & Dickinson, 1999), I expect 
expatriates to either be on the subsidiary’s board, when it exists, or significantly 
substitute for the subsidiary’s board, when it does not exist, and have a parent-subsidiary 
governance role in addition to their subsidiary management role. Thus, in this study, I 
broaden the role of expatriates from just being subsidiary managers to having a role as 
parent-subsidiary governors. 
As foreign subsidiary governors, and similar to most domestic companies’ board 
members, expatriates are expected to have conformance (monitoring) and performance 
(directing) roles. The conformance role includes an internal role, namely monitoring 
management, and an external role, namely being accountable to stakeholders. The 
performance role includes a short-term-oriented role, namely policymaking, and a long-
term-oriented role, namely strategy formulation (Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011; Tricker, 
2012). 
Expatriates are employees coming from an MNE’s headquarters or other entities 
and working in a foreign-country subsidiary of that MNE. Expatriates typically function 
as operational governance mechanisms and social governance mechanisms for their 
parents (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Boyacigiller, 1990; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000). 
Headquarter-subsidiary research shows that as subsidiary control increases, 
headquarters use of expatriates as a parent supervision mechanism increases (O’Donnell, 
2000). Therefore, I contend that subsidiaries with more expatriates are expected to be 
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better monitored and governed, thus minimizing parent-subsidiary agency costs and 
agency problems and consequently increasing their survival likelihood. 
I argue that the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a positive 
nonlinear logarithmic effect on the survival of the foreign subsidiary but does not 
necessarily have an effect on the profitability of the foreign subsidiary. That is because 
generally an MNE parent (principal) with more expatriates in a foreign subsidiary (agent) 
is expected to have more influence, than a counterpart with fewer expatriates, to 
minimize parent-subsidiary agency costs and agency problems. However, the MNE 
parent may not necessarily be able to maximize foreign subsidiary revenues or cover the 
costs of the generally more expensive expatriates versus local managers. Minimizing 
agency costs and problems consequently increases the survival likelihood but not 
necessarily the profitability of the foreign subsidiary. 
In this study I theorize the number of expatriates, and not the percentage of 
expatriates, in the foreign subsidiary, as the antecedent to the subsidiary’s survival, for 
the following two reasons. First, from a governance perspective, a small number of 
expatriates, although it may not be a big percentage of expatriates, in the foreign 
subsidiary, may be enough for the parent to govern the foreign subsidiary. Second, also 
from a governance perspective, the governance impact of one expatriate in a smaller 
subsidiary may be similar to his/her impact in a bigger subsidiary, although the expatriate 
percentage in these two subsidiaries may be significantly different. These two cases are 
particularly applicable when the expatriate(s) include key top managers such as the CEO, 
CFO, etc. and when these expatriates are fully supported by the MNE parent; two 
conditions that can be applicable in many foreign subsidiaries.  
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MNE parent-foreign subsidiary relationships are similar to principal-agent 
relationships (Tan & Mahoney, 2006) since, the same way a principal delegates decision 
making authority to its agent, an MNE parent delegates decision making authority to its 
foreign subsidiary (O’Donnell, 2000). However, parent-subsidiary relationships have 
more pronounced information asymmetry between the parent and the subsidiary than the 
information asymmetry present between traditional domestic principals and agents. This 
higher level of information asymmetry arises from the different kinds of distances 
(physical, political, legal, etc.) between the headquarters and the subsidiary. 
Parent-subsidiary distance and information asymmetry increase moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Shapiro, 2005). They increase moral hazard because they make it more 
difficult and costly for the parent to observe and/or monitor the subsidiary’s actions. They 
increase adverse selection because they make it more difficult and costly for the parent to 
evaluate whether the subsidiary’s actions are in the parent’s best interests (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Agency theory suggests that boards are motivated to monitor management and 
align management’s interests with those of owners primarily through two board 
incentives, namely board independence and director compensation. It argues that 
independent outside directors (directors who are not current or former 
managers/employees of the firm) have a greater incentive to monitor management 
because they are not socially or economically related to management. It also argues that 
the interests of directors with equity compensation will be more aligned with those of 
shareholders and thus will have a greater incentive to monitor the performance of 
management and direct them to pursue shareholder interests (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
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In a similar manner, the interests of expatriates, who are usually on the payroll of 
the MNE-parent, will be aligned with the interests of the parent (Bonache & Fernández, 
1997). Thus expatriates are expected to be and tend to be committed to the MNE-parent 
as a whole (as well as to the subsidiary) and therefore are deemed trustworthy parent 
representatives in ‘distant’ foreign subsidiaries (Gong, 2003). Thus they are considered 
extended forms of headquarters-subsidiary control or monitoring (Boyacigiller, 1990) 
and alignment (Tan & Mahoney, 2006). 
Expatriates socially align or direct the parent’s and subsidiary’s interests, goals, 
actions, and outcomes in a way that is beneficial for both the subsidiary and parent by 
continually communicating and negotiating strategy and performance between the parent 
and subsidiary (Macedo-Soares & Schubsky, 2010). Moreover, they socially or culturally 
control or monitor a subsidiary’s goals, actions, and outcomes to fit with those set for it 
by the parent by sharing and inculcating the parent’s values and norms with the 
subsidiary’s managers and employees (Ouchi, 1979). 
Expatriates monitor foreign subsidiaries’ strategy implementation, successor 
training, and evaluating and rewarding the TMT (Moore, 2006; Rindova, 1999; Selmer & 
Luk, 1995). They also align these activities with the MNE-parent’s expectations by 
scrutinizing, evaluating, and regulating the actions of TMT members to meet the 
expectations of the MNE-parent, thus lowering moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Lower foreign subsidiary moral hazard and adverse selection and greater 
alignment of the parent’s and the subsidiary’s interests lowers parent-subsidiary agency 
costs and minimizes their agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; O’Donnell, 2000). 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that reducing agency problems significantly contributes 
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to the survival of different organizational forms. Similarly, I argue that minimizing 
parent-subsidiary agency problems considerably increases the survival likelihood of a 
subsidiary (Jensen, 1983). 
Although the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is expected to increase 
the survival of the foreign subsidiary, this expatriate-survival relationship is anticipated to 
be nonlinear logarithmic. That occurs because, as the number of expatriates increases and 
agency costs and problems decrease, subsidiary self-serving behaviors decline. 
However self-serving behaviors decline at a decreasing rate with each additional 
expatriate, since the marginal benefit from expatriate governance gradually decelerates 
(Harzing, 2002). That is because the marginal control benefits, such as direct surveillance 
of foreign subsidiaries by MNE parent managers, instilling parent’s values and goals in 
the subsidiary, and weaving informal communication networks between parent and 
subsidiary and among subsidiaries (Harzing, 2002), reaped from an additional expatriate, 
gradually decrease. 
Therefore, I argue that increments at lower expatriate numbers (e.g. from 0 to 5) 
are more profound than similar increments at higher expatriate numbers (e.g. over 6). My 
logic is that, at the higher end, the total expatriate costs may become significantly more 
than the total agency costs saved by the assignment of these expatriates (Collings, 
Scullion, & Morley, 2007). This in turn may induce MNE parents to replace additional 
expatriates by other control alternatives, such as international training programs, 
meetings, and task forces, that may serve the same control purpose at a lower cost 
(Harzing, 2002). 
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Although I expect the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary to have an 
effect on the survival of the foreign subsidiary, for the following reasons I do not expect 
it to necessarily have an effect on the profitability of the foreign subsidiary. First, the 
number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is expected to minimize MNE parent-
foreign subsidiary agency problems that are in turn expected to increase foreign 
subsidiary survival. However, expatriates are not expected to maximize foreign 
subsidiary revenues due to their lower host country legitimacy (Schotter & Beamish, 
2011a) and reduced understanding of the local market (e.g. local customers, suppliers, 
and competitors), local culture, local language, etc. compared to their local counterparts 
(Widmier, Brouthers, & Beamish, 2008). Lower revenues would lead to lower 
profitability or at best unimproved profitability. 
Second, while expatriates may improve control, coordination, and knowledge 
transfer (Widmier et al., 2008), due to their lower host country legitimacy, they increase 
operating costs incurred in effectively managing the local workforce (Gaur, Delios, & 
Singh, 2007). Third, in many cases expatriate costs may outweigh their financial benefits. 
For example, it is generally estimated that the cost associated with an international 
assignment is between three and five times an assignee’s home salary per year, let alone a 
corresponding local’s salary (Selmer, 2001). Moreover, expatriate managers’ failure rates 
range from a low of 3 percent to as high as 70 percent with the estimated cost of a failed 
expatriate assignment to be as high as $1,000,000 (Crocitto, Sullivan, & Carraher, 2005). 
Furthermore, the benefits of expatriate assignments are not very clear and only few 
companies measure expatriate return on investment (ROI) (Collings et al., 2007). 
Therefore I hypothesize that: 
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Hypothesis 2a: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a positive 
nonlinear logarithmic effect on that foreign subsidiary’s survival. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary has a negligible 
effect on its profitability. 
 
2.3. Risk Orientation (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance 
Mechanism) and Performance 
At the public sector level, the term ‘risk governance’ refers to the ‘various ways 
in which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with [public 
or societal] risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt & 
Renn, 2011). I define risk governance at the business sector level, as the ways in which 
corporate boards in general, and MNE boards in particular, oversee corporate risks 
surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity. Within the risk and governance 
literatures I thus expand the use of the term ‘risk governance’ beyond the public sector to 
the business sector. 
It is important to note that corporate risk governance and corporate risk 
management are not the same. Risk management refers to “the culture, processes and 
structures that are directed towards taking advantage of potential opportunities while 
managing potential adverse effects (ASXCGC, 2006: 31).” The Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO) is usually the highest corporate manager responsible for risk management. 
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Risk governance refers to the board “ascertaining, to a reasonable degree, that the 
executive team has identified and assessed critical risks and has appropriate risk 
mitigation and management in place that are designed to address the risks that the 
organization faces (Errity & Ristuccia, 2012: 1).” The Risk Governance Committee is 
usually the board-level committee responsible for governing/overseeing company risks. If 
there is no risk governance committee, the full board holds this responsibility. To 
highlight the importance of risk governance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued Proxy Disclosure Enhancements rules in December 2009, 
which were effective in February 2010. These rules require disclosure of the board’s role 
with regard to risk oversight in the company’s annual proxy statement. The board’s risk 
oversight activities include overseeing the risk management infrastructure, addressing 
risk and strategy simultaneously, assisting with risk appetite and tolerance, monitoring 
risks, overseeing risk exposure, overseeing and supporting the CRO, and consulting 
external risk experts (Errity & Ristuccia, 2012).  
Risk governance is increasingly expected and required from boards of directors. 
This is evident from the clear trend by capital market regulators and stock exchanges 
around the world, since the early 2000s, to recommend to, or require, corporations to 
improve their internal risk management practices (Brown, Steen, & Foreman, 2009; 
Errity & Ristuccia, 2012; Kleffner, Lee, & McGannon, 2003; Sobel & Reding, 2004). 
To govern their risks, MNEs explicitly or implicitly follow one of three risk 
orientations. I define risk orientation (Pan & Tse, 2000) as an organization’s degree of 
comfort when facing uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous gains or losses (Ehrlich & 
Maestas, 2010; van Asselt & Renn, 2011). I describe MNEs as endorsing one of the 
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following three risk orientations: extreme risk-averting orientation, moderate risk-taking 
orientation, or excessive risk-seeking orientation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
I adopt the view that generally subsidiaries’ and parents’ risk orientations are 
similar. This may contradict agency theory’s belief that principals’ (parents) and agents’ 
(subsidiaries) risk profiles are different, namely that agents are risk-averse whereas 
principals are risk-neutral (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994). However, Lane, Cannella, & 
Lubatkin (1998) found some evidence to suggest that the risk profiles of principals and 
agents are more similar than different.  Moreover, anecdotal evidence collected from the 
interviews I conducted with subsidiary general managers showed that almost all MNEs 
had formal risk compliance policies/guidelines/systems and that their subsidiaries 
typically complied with these risk policies. However, this is not to say that these 
guidelines do not provide subsidiaries with some risk discretion when making their 
decisions. Therefore, this section’s following arguments are built on the assumption that 
generally subsidiaries’ and parents’ risk orientations are similar. 
I argue that an MNE parent’s risk has a nonlinear, declining, s-shaped effect on its 
foreign subsidiary’s survival (see Figure 2.1). Accordingly, I argue that a subsidiary of a 
parent with an extreme risk-averting orientation is more likely to survive than a 
counterpart of a parent with a moderate risk-taking orientation, which in turn is more 
likely to survive than a counterpart of a parent with an excessive risk-seeking orientation. 
Furthermore, I contend that different subsidiaries within the same risk orientation 
have different survival likelihoods. Specifically, for subsidiaries of parents who are 
moderate risk-takers and who thus formally or informally encourage their subsidiaries to 
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be moderate risk-takers as well, the higher their risk level compared to their industry 
peers, the higher their survival likelihood. In contrast, for subsidiaries of parents who are 
either extreme risk-averters or excessive risk-seekers and who thus formally or 
informally encourage their subsidiaries to be correspondingly extreme risk-averters or 
excessive risk-seekers as well, the higher their risk level compared to their industry peers, 
the lower their survival likelihood. 
To develop these arguments further, I first clarify what is meant by a rational 
actor and a boundedly rational actor. Kahneman (2003) describes a rational actor as 
someone endowed with a cognitive system that has the logical ability of sound reasoning 
and the low computing costs of fast intuition. He adds “Reasoning is done deliberately 
and effortfully, but intuitive thoughts seem to come spontaneously to mind, without 
conscious search or computation, and without effort (Kahneman, 2003: 1450). The 
operations of [intuition] are fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally 
charged; they are also governed by habit, and are therefore difficult to control or modify. 
The operations of [reasoning] are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; 
they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule-governed. The difference in effort 
provides the most useful indications of whether a given mental process should be 
assigned to [intuition] or [reasoning] (Kahneman, 2003: 1451).” In contrast, a boundedly 
rational actor relies more on intuition than on reasoning and his/her behavior is not 
guided by what he/she is able to compute, but by what he/she happens to see at a given 
moment. He/she often processes information in a superficial manner and represents 
categories by prototypes. Given his heavier reliance on intuition, a boundedly rational 
actor is more prone to biases and errors in thinking (Kahneman, 2003). 
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For subsidiaries encouraged to be moderate risk-takers, I argue that the higher 
their risk level compared to their moderate risk-taking industry peers, the higher their 
survival likelihood. That is because moderate risk-taking subsidiaries are considered to be 
rational risk-takers since they neither extremely avoid risks nor excessively seek risks but 
take risks in a moderate manner. Prospect theory suggests that they rationally calculate 
the prospects of the outcomes of their risky choices then wisely choose to take risks that 
are more likely to benefit them than to harm them. Moreover, it suggests that taking risks 
in a rational manner allows the subsidiary to make more optimal decisions that increase 
its competitiveness and thus its survival likelihood (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
For subsidiaries encouraged to be extreme risk-averters or excessive risk-seekers I 
argue that the higher their risk level compared to their industry peers, the lower their 
survival likelihood. That is because extreme risk-averters are considered to be boundedly 
rational actors since their judgment is biased. Prospect theory suggests that their 
judgment is biased because they intuitively misjudge the prospects of the outcomes of 
their risky choices by overestimating the likelihood of loss. Consequently, they 
erroneously avoid risks that could have benefited them if they had taken them. Avoiding 
risks in an unintendedly biased manner leads the subsidiary to make more suboptimal 
decisions that decrease its competitiveness and thus its survival likelihood (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). 
Relatedly, a similar argument holds for excessive risk-seekers because they are 
considered to be boundedly rational actors since their judgment is biased. Prospect theory 
suggests that their judgment is biased because they intuitively misjudge the prospects of 
the outcomes of their risky choices by overestimating the likelihood of gain. 
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Consequently, they erroneously seek risks that ultimately harm them. Seeking risks in an 
unintendedly biased manner leads the subsidiary to make more suboptimal decisions that 
decrease its competitiveness and thus its survival likelihood (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). 
Although I expect an MNE parent’s risk to have an effect on its foreign 
subsidiary’s survival, I do not expect it to necessarily have an effect on its foreign 
subsidiary’s profitability for the following reasons. First, the empirical evidence 
measured over the past 50 to 75 years regarding the risk-return relationship is mixed or 
weak at best (Lundblad, 2007). For example, mainstream finance theory, namely the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and 
Mossin (1966) predicts a positive relationship between risk and return. More recent 
research still supports this prediction (e.g. Bansal and Lundblad (2002), Ghysels, Santa-
Clara, and Valkanov (2005), etc.). However, an important and rich strategy research 
stream, developed by Bowman (1980, 1982, 1984), known as Bowman’s Paradox, 
predicts a negative relationship between risk and return. More recent research still 
supports this prediction as well (e.g. Andersen, Denrell, and Bettis (2007), Deephouse 
and Wiseman (2000), etc.). Moreover, a third stream of research shows that there is no 
significant relationship between risk and return (e.g. Fletcher (2000), Fama and French 
(1992), Strong and Xu (1997)). 
Second, this relationship seems to depend on many different factors including 
data used (Bali & Peng, 2006), statistical techniques used (Ghysels et al., 2005) measures 
used (Baucus, Golec, & Cooper, 1993; McNamara & Bromiley, 1999), market conditions 
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(e.g. whether it is an up market or a down market) (Fletcher, 2000), seasonality of risk 
premia (Corhay, Hawawini, & Michel, 1987), etc. Therefore I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between parent risk orientation and foreign 
subsidiary survival is nonlinear (declining s-shaped), with the slope negative for parents 
with an extremely risk-averse orientation, positive for parents with a moderate risk-
taking orientation, and negative for parents with an excessively risk-seeking orientation 
(see Figure 2.1). 
 
Hypothesis 3b: An MNE parent’s risk orientation has a negligible effect on its 
foreign subsidiary’s profitability. 
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Figure 2.1 Relationship between Risk Orientation (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary 
Governance Mechanism) and Subsidiary Survival 
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2.4. Regional Headquarters (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary Governance 
Mechanism) and Performance 
A regional headquarters (RHQ) is a subsidiary or an office that has control over 
the operation of one or more other offices and subsidiaries in other economies or 
countries in the region (Enright, 2005b). It adds value by linking the activities of 
corporate headquarters with the activities of the subsidiaries within its region (Enright, 
2005a). A RHQ may perform various activities such as corporate governance, 
management, and strategy activities as well as aggregated scale-sensitive functional and 
support activities (Enright, 2005b). An RHQ may have an administrative charter, an 
entrepreneurial charter, or both (Mahnke, Ambos, Nell, & Hobdari, 2012). In this thesis I 
focus on the RHQs’ corporate governance activity which is considered part of an RHQ 
administrative charter. That is, I focus on a RHQ role in governing its parent’s foreign 
subsidiaries that are operating in the countries within its region. As an intermediate 
subsidiary governance mechanism, some of the corporate governance sub-activities that a 
RHQ performs include: coordination of other operations within region, monitoring of 
other regional operations, reporting regional activities to parent company, regional liaison 
center for parent company, and regional strategy formulation (Enright, 2005b). 
A RHQ functions as an intermediate subsidiary governance mechanism because it 
acts as a mediating hierarch (Blair & Stout, 2001; Lan & Heracleous, 2010) between its 
corporate HQ and its HQs’ foreign subsidiaries operating in the countries within the 
RHQs’ region. As a mediating hierarch it mediates the tension between its corporate 
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HQs’ call for global integration / efficiency and its local subsidiaries’ push for national 
effectiveness / responsiveness (Bartlett & Beamish, 2014; Doz & Prahalad, 1984).  
From an agency theory perspective, as a governance mechanism, a RHQ 
simultaneously acts as an agent to its MNE parent and as a principal to its parent’s 
foreign subsidiaries operating within its region. I argue that having a RHQ improves the 
MNE-parent’s governance of the subsidiaries operating within the RHQ’s region by 
reducing parent-subsidiary agency problems. This, in turn, improves the survival 
likelihood of these foreign subsidiaries. 
One major reason why an MNE-parent establishes a RHQ is to better govern a 
group of foreign subsidiaries in a geographically, economically, legally, politically, etc. 
distant region by reducing the agency problems between the MNE-parent and those 
distant subsidiaries. Establishing a RHQ improves the communication process between 
the MNE-parent and its ‘distant’ foreign subsidiaries affiliated with the established RHQ. 
Geographically distant subsidiaries may be in time zones that are different from that of 
the MNE-parent. Economically distant subsidiaries may be in markets with economic 
environments / characteristics that are different from those of the MNE-parent’s market. 
Legally distant subsidiaries may be in countries with laws and regulations that are 
different from those of the MNE-parent’s country. Politically distant subsidiaries may be 
in countries with political environments / systems that are different from those of the 
MNE parent’s country (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010). 
The establishment of a RHQ improves the communication between MNE parent 
and its foreign subsidiaries affiliated with the RHQ because the RHQ understands and 
bridges the parent’s characteristics and environments and the subsidiaries’ characteristics 
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and environments.  For example a RHQ understands both the parent’s strategy and 
expectations for the region and the subsidiaries’ geographical, economic, legal, and 
political operating environments in that region. This gives the RHQ the capability to 
facilitate the information flow and information interpretation between the MNE parent 
and its corresponding regional subsidiaries. This also gives the RHQ the ability to 
provide operational and context-specific subsidiary information to global HQ, 
information that is essential for global HQ to govern its foreign subsidiaries (Ciabuschi, 
Dellestrand, & Holm, 2012). Moreover, this gives the RHQ the ability to monitor several 
subsidiaries (agents) on behalf of the global HQ which reduces the number of agents the 
global HQ needs to monitor directly (Alfoldi, Clegg, & McGaughey, 2012). As a result, 
this helps the RHQ reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard and improve the 
interests, goals, and outcomes alignment between the parent and its subsidiaries operating 
in the region. 
This, in turn, decreases the agency problems between the MNE-parent and the 
subsidiaries in the region. It also decreases the agency costs that may result from 
subsidiaries’ (agents’) pursuing their self-interest at the expense of parent (principal) 
interests (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). By decreasing parent-subsidiary agency problems 
and agency costs, the RHQ helps both its subsidiaries and ultimately its parent increase 
their survival likelihoods (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
Although I expect foreign subsidiaries governed by RHQ to have a higher 
survival likelihood than their counterparts not governed by RHQ, I do not expect them to 
necessarily be more profitable than these counterparts for the following reason. A RHQ 
acts as an additional hierarchical level in an organization’s structure. It increases an 
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organization’s vertical complexity (the number of levels in the hierarchy of an 
organization) (Carillo & Kopelman, 1991). The literature suggests that the impact of 
vertical complexity on performance is mixed at best (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Handel, 
2014). Bureaucratic theorists such as Blau (1972; Blau & Meyer, 1987) from sociology, 
Chandler (1977; 1990) from business, and Williamson (1985; 1975) from economics 
argue that bureaucracies are efficient forms of organization. Whereas, post-bureaucratic 
and neo-liberal organization theories argue that leaner organizations perform better than 
bureaucratic ones (e.g. Carillo and Kopelman (1991), Love and Nohria (2005), etc.). 
Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional headquarters 
(RHQs) in the regions where these foreign subsidiaries operate are more likely to survive 
than their counterparts of parents without RHQs in the regions where they operate. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Foreign subsidiaries of parents with regional headquarters 
(RHQs) in the regions where these foreign subsidiaries operate do not necessarily 
financially perform better than their counterparts of parents without RHQs in the regions 
where they operate. 
 
2.5. Expatriates Moderate the Effect of Ownership on Survival 
Previous sections that developed the ownership-performance and expatriates-
performance hypotheses suggested that MNE parents use their ownership in their foreign 
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subsidiaries as a strategic governance mechanism (Alces, 2008; Doz & Prahalad, 1984; 
Xu et al., 2004); and use the expatriates they send to their foreign subsidiaries as social, 
cultural, and / or operational governance mechanisms (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; 
Boyacigiller, 1990; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000). They use these mechanisms to reduce 
MNE parent (principal)-foreign subsidiary (agent) agency problems and thus increase the 
survival of their foreign subsidiaries. This section argues that expatriates complement / 
substitute for MNE parent ownership and thus moderate the effect of MNE parent 
ownership on foreign subsidiary survival. 
In classical domestic corporate governance, shareowners govern management’s 
behaviors through several ways that include the following: Monitoring their company’s 
stock price through the stock market and buying and selling their company’s stocks as a 
signal to management of their (i.e. shareholders) satisfaction / dissatisfaction with their 
company’s governance and performance; Electing nonexecutive directors to represent 
them on boards and thus indirectly shape the strategic decisions, direction, and outcomes 
of their company according to their (i.e. shareowners) best interests; Communicating and 
negotiating directly with management about their (i.e. stockowners) preferences; Voting 
on important decisions during company general meetings; Formally submitting 
shareholder proxy proposals to companies; Using the media to alert other investors to 
their company’s problems and their (i.e. shareholders) proxy proposals (Gillan & Starks, 
2000, 2007). 
In MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance, among the above mentioned ways, 
parents may be limited to using the following methods to govern their foreign 
subsidiaries: Directly negotiating with the foreign subsidiary’s management; Appointing 
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subsidiary board directors who come from the MNE parent to align the subsidiary’s 
interests with the parent’s interests; Voting on important foreign subsidiary-related 
decisions during company meetings (Konopaske, Werner, & Neupert, 2002). In addition, 
they may provide training, services, and resources and send expatriates to their 
subsidiaries to govern these foreign subsidiaries (Schaan, 1988).  
Therefore, in MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance, parents may use 
expatriates as social, cultural, and / or operational governance mechanisms together with 
ownership to govern their foreign subsidiaries. As social and cultural governance 
mechanisms, expatriates work on aligning the values, practices, and informal 
communications as well as the mission, vision, and objectives, of the subsidiary with 
those of its parent. They perform these functions so that the culture and social behavior of 
the subsidiary and its employees are consistent with those of its parent (Fenwick et al., 
1999; Harzing, 2002). As operational governance mechanisms, expatriates monitor and 
(dis)approve of subsidiary activities such as production, R&D, marketing, and finance 
activities and align these activities so that the operational behavior of the subsidiary is 
consistent with the formal policies and informal expectations of its parent (Torbiörn, 
1994; Xu et al., 2004).  
Moreover, ownership is an ex ante MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanism during international expansions while expatriates are an ex post MNE parent-
foreign subsidiary governance mechanism during international operations (Konopaske et 
al., 2002). Therefore, ownership is considered to be an ex ante strategic governance 
mechanism while expatriates are considered to be an ex post social, cultural, and / or 
operational governance mechanism. Despite this, from looking at the way these two 
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governance mechanisms are used by shareowners, one can see that their uses overlap in 
several ways and that they may complement and / or substitute for each other (Chung & 
Beamish, 2005; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Konopaske et al., 2002; 
Schaan, 1988) in reducing MNE parent-foreign subsidiary agency problems and thus 
increasing foreign subsidiary survival. Therefore I argue that expatriates moderate the 
effect of ownership on subsidiary survival, such that this effect is stronger when the 
number of expatriates is lower and weaker when the number of expatriates is higher. 
Given the above mentioned ways MNE parents use ownership and expatriates to 
govern their foreign subsidiaries, one can argue that the effect of increasing parent 
ownership on subsidiary survival will be higher when the number of expatriates in the 
subsidiary is lower than when the number of expatriates in the subsidiary is higher. That 
is because, when the number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is higher, expatriates 
as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism are expected to almost completely 
substitute for ownership as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism, since the greater 
number of expatriates is expected to completely substitute for an owner’s efforts to 
monitor and align the behavior of the subsidiary with its (i.e. owner’s / parent’s) 
expectations. Whereas, when the number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is lower, 
expatriates as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism are expected to only 
complement ownership as a parent-subsidiary governance mechanism, since the fewer 
number of expatriates are expected to only complement an owner’s efforts to monitor and 
align the behavior of the subsidiary with its (i.e. owner’s / parent’s) expectations. 
For example, when the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is high, it 
would be expected that they will be governing the subsidiary’s culture as well as its 
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operations. That is, they will be working on aligning the subsidiary’s values, mission, 
vision, and objectives as well as its various activities (e.g. production, R&D, marketing, 
finance, etc.). This would replace the MNE parent’s efforts to govern the foreign 
subsidiary through a subsidiary board or through voting on important subsidiary-related 
decisions in company meetings or through providing training, services, and / or resources 
to the subsidiary from a distant. Consequently, this would reduce the effect of a higher 
level of MNE parent ownership on a foreign subsidiary’s survival. 
Whereas, when the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary is low, it would 
be expected that their influence will be lower than when that number is high and thus 
they may be governing only the subsidiary’s culture or operations or neither. Thus their 
presence in the subsidiary would not replace the MNE parent’s efforts to govern the 
subsidiary through the parent’s own, generally more distant, governance mechanisms but 
would probably complement these efforts. Consequently, this would increase the effect of 
a higher level of MNE parent ownership on a foreign subsidiary’s survival. Therefore I 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Expatriates modify the effect of ownership on foreign subsidiary 
survival; the effect of MNE parent ownership on foreign subsidiary survival is stronger 
(weaker) when the number of expatriates in the foreign subsidiary is lower (higher).  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. PILOT CANADIAN STUDY: METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
3.1. Methods 
Following recent calls for methodological advancements in international business 
research (Punnett & Shenkar, 2004; Scandura & Williams, 2000; Schotter & Beamish, 
2013), I used a multi-method (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) approach. First, I 
conducted a pilot quantitative survival analysis to investigate how Japanese MNE parents 
governed their Canadian subsidiaries which were more likely to survive, compared to 
Canadian subsidiaries that were less likely to survive. Second, after quantitatively 
confirming that better surviving Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs are generally 
governed through higher parent ownership ratios, higher numbers of expatriates, and 
lower levels of risk, I conducted ten interviews (McCracken, 1988), each around one hour 
in length, with Canadian subsidiary CEOs, board members, or top management team 
(TMT) members, mostly of Japanese MNE parents, to better understand why these better 
surviving Canadian subsidiaries are governed that way by their Japanese MNE parents. I 
combined quantitative and qualitative methods to ensure higher levels of relevance and 
validity (Jick, 1979). Following Bruning, Sonpar, and Wang (2012), and Bresman, 
Birkinshaw, and Nobel (1999) I (1) describe my methods in two sections, quantitative 
and qualitative approaches, and (2) present my statistical findings in a quantitative results 
section and my interview findings in a qualitative results section. 
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3.1.1. Quantitative Approach 
3.1.1.1. Sample and Data 
This pilot study tested my theory on a sample of Canadian subsidiaries of 
Japanese parent MNEs. These companies were identified from several editions of Kaigai 
Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, Kuni-Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments, by Country), 
published by Toyo Keizai (referred to as the TK dataset hereafter). The TK dataset 
provides subsidiary-level data on the overseas activities of Japanese MNEs. 
A Canadian-Japanese sample was appropriate for several reasons. First, Japanese 
inward FDI stock into Canada amounted to approximately $16 billion in 2010, an 
increase of 11 percent from 2009, and Japan is the leading Asian foreign direct investor 
in Canada followed by China (Canada, 2012). Second, the Canadian-Japanese sample 
provided Canadian subsidiary-level governance data which could also be matched with 
Japanese parent-level governance data. Third, additional data on Canadian subsidiaries of 
Japanese MNEs could be found in the Dun & Bradstreet Canadian Key Business 
Directories for all the years of the sample. Fourth, the extensive time distribution in the 
dataset offered considerable variance in the survival-vs.-exit outcomes of the Canadian 
subsidiaries. 
Additional Canadian subsidiary-level data were hand-coded from the 1991-2009 
editions of the Dun & Bradstreet Canadian Key Business Directory to complement the 
TK’s subsidiary-level data. Japanese MNE parent-level data were drawn from the Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank of Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. (NEEDS) and matched 
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with parent MNE names in the TK data. Country-level data were collected from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
3.1.1.2. Variables 
Dependent Variable (DV) 
Subsidiary Exit: Following previous studies on subsidiary survival (Dai, Eden, & 
Beamish, 2013), this study’s dependent variable Subsidiary Exit is an indicator variable, 
SubsidiaryExit, that takes a value of 1 if subsidiary x exits at time t, and 0 if it remains 
(survives). Observations start in 1990, and continue until an exit occurs, or they are right-
censored in 2008. I follow Delios and Beamish (2001) in treating delisted subsidiaries 
from the sample as exits, because the TK dataset is almost exhaustive for all cases of 
Japanese FDI. This approach has been validated by another study by  Delios and Beamish 
(2004) in which they compared identified cases of exit in the TK dataset with reported 
cases of exit. For the period 1990–2008 there were 69 identified exits out of 196 
Canadian subsidiaries of 142 Japanese parent MNEs and a total of 1,621 observations. 
Independent Variables (IVs) 
Ownership Ratio: consistent with previous research ownership ratio is measured 
as the logarithm of the percentage of the focal subsidiary’s equity owned by the largest 
Japanese owner. The largest Japanese owner is used because typically it is considered the 
Japanese parent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). 
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Expatriate Number: consistent with previous research (Chung & Beamish, 
2005; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Plourde, Parker, & Schaan, 2013) I measure expatriate 
number as the logarithm of the number of expatriates in the subsidiary. 
Risk Orientation: I measured risk orientation as the Japanese parent’s sector-
adjusted debt ratio. To calculate this measure I first calculated the Japanese parent’s debt 
ratio (i.e. total liabilities divided by total assets). Second, I calculated the average debt 
ratio for each sector of the three sectors: Manufacturing, Trade, and Services & Others 
(see next page for a detailed description of sector) by adding the debt ratios of all the 
Japanese parents in a sector and dividing their total by the number of parents in that 
sector. Finally, I divided each Japanese parent’s debt ratio by its sector’s debt ratio to get 
each firm’s sector-adjusted debt ratio. I also squared and cubed the sector-adjusted debt 
ratio to test the nonlinear s-shaped relationship between risk orientation and survival 
likelihood that I hypothesized. 
Using a firm’s sector-adjusted debt ratio as a proxy to measure its risk orientation 
is appropriate for several reasons. First, firm debt ratios have been used in the literature to 
measure firm risk (Abor, 2007; Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970; Berger, Ofek, & 
Yermack, 1997; Friend & Lang, 1988; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wen, Rwegasira, & 
Bilderbeek, 2002). Second, among the other used debt ratio measures, the debt ratio 
measure that I used (i.e. the total liability divided by total assets measure) has been 
shown to exhibit the highest association with risk (Beaver, 1966). Third, this pilot study’s 
sample consists of Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs and sector appears to 
influence governance mechanisms in general (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001) and 
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corporate debt ratios in Japan in particular (Remmers, Stonehill, Wright, & Beekhuisen, 
1974). 
Control Variables 
I controlled for several variables that the literature suggests may be possible 
alternative explanations for subsidiary survival and that could consequently confound my 
results. First, at the subsidiary level, I controlled for the following variables. 
Subsidiary age: consistent with (Dai et al., 2013) I controlled for subsidiary age to 
account for (1) the possible effect of the liability of newness and (2) the possible effect of 
the ability of older subsidiaries to adapt to host-country conditions, on subsidiary 
survival. I measured subsidiary age as the logarithm of the number of years a subsidiary 
has operated since its date of establishment in the host country. 
Subsidiary Size: I controlled for subsidiary size to account for liabilities of 
smallness and structural inertia since previous studies have shown a positive relationship 
between the size and survival of foreign subsidiaries (Li, 1995). I measured subsidiary 
size as the logarithm of the total number of subsidiary employees. 
Subsidiary sector: I controlled for subsidiary sector. Given that my Canadian 
subsidiaries’ sample was a relatively small sample I grouped all the industries into 3 
broad sectors (manufacturing = 1, trade = 2, and services & others =3) to keep the 
number of variables in my model at a statistically acceptable level. 
Second, at the parent level, consistent with Kim, Lu, and Rhee (2012) I controlled 
for Parent Performance and Parent Size since these variables are known to usually affect 
subsidiary survival (Delios & Beamish, 2001). I measured parent performance as the 
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return on assets of the parent and measured parent size as the logarithm of the parent’s 
number of employees. 
Third, at the country level, consistent with Dai et al. (2013), I controlled for Host 
Market Size, Host Market Potential, and Host Market Inflation Rate, factors expected to 
influence foreign subsidiary survival, to control for the effect of their variation over the 
years of the study on foreign subsidiary survival. I measured host market size as the 
logarithm of host country per capita gross domestic product (GDP). I measured host 
market potential as the percentage change in GDP of the host country from one year to 
the other. I measured host market inflation rate as the inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %), 
for different years. 
 
3.1.2. Qualitative Approach 
I interviewed 10 participants who had the following positions. Nine were working 
at Canadian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs, mainly Japanese MNEs; six were subsidiary 
CEOs; one was a subsidiary board member; and two were subsidiary TMT members. The 
tenth was the Subsidiary Governance Senior Officer at the Canadian headquarters of a 
very large Canadian-based MNE, who was responsible for governance of the local and 
foreign subsidiaries of that MNE. In addition, one of the CEOs I interviewed was a 
former Canadian subsidiary CEO and a current Director at the Japanese MNE 
headquarters of that Canadian subsidiary. One of the major reasons for interviewing these 
two latter participants was to get a headquarters perspective, in addition to the subsidiary 
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perspective, on foreign subsidiary governance, so as to triangulate my data and reduce 
bias. 
Five of the participants worked in Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs and 
the other five worked in Canadian subsidiaries of foreign non-Japanese MNEs of 
different national origins. One important reason for interviewing CEOs, BOD members, 
and / or TMT members of Canadian subsidiaries of non-Japanese MNEs as well as 
Japanese MNEs was to enhance the generalizability of this thesis’ findings.  The 
interviews were conducted in mid-2013. The Ethics Approval Notice, Introduction Letter, 
and Consent Form are available in Appendix A. 
The purpose of conducting these interviews was to enhance my understanding on 
how MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries and why they govern them that way. 
Consequently, in order to be interviewed, participants had to be CEOs, board members, 
or TMT members of Canadian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs and particularly Japanese 
MNEs. Participants were recruited mainly through personal contacts and referrals by 
these personal contacts. Some were also recruited through the Ivey Alumni Relations 
office and the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) and Canadian Foundation for 
Governance Research (CFGR). 
The interviews were semi-structured; the interview guide is available in Appendix 
B. Broadly, the interviews focused on the following three overarching questions: (1) How 
do you influence the changes in your subsidiary’s governance mechanisms / structures, 
namely the use of expatriates, ownership, and risk? (2) Why do you attempt to influence 
the changes in these governance mechanisms / structures (i.e. the use of expatriates, 
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ownership, and risk) in your subsidiary? and (3) How does your parent use these 
governance mechanisms (i.e. ownership, expatriates, and risk) to govern your subsidiary? 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed then coded and analyzed with 
NVIVO (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Finally, following Bruning et al. (2012) and Yin’s 
(2011) qualitative data presentation and composition approaches, my qualitative findings 
were presented in a qualitative results section as brief direct or indirect explanations, 
narratives, or quotations. 
 
“It is generally accepted that measurement instruments affect that which they are 
trying to measure, thus biasing the value of the measurement from the ‘true’ value. This 
phenomenon is referred to as measurement error and there are often statistical and 
mechanical ways to ‘correct’ for it (Lupton, 2011: v).” In qualitative research, such as the 
one in this part of this thesis, the measurement device is the researcher. Accordingly, I 
provide this brief reflexivity statement to help the reader understand my background, 
experiences with the explored phenomenon, and how my background and experiences 
may have shaped my interpretation of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). 
I am a person who has both Lebanese and Canadian citizenships. I was raised, 
studied, and worked for several years in Lebanon. I recently lived, studied, and worked 
for several years in Canada. In Lebanon, I lived in the Greater Beirut Area; Was raised by 
a father who was an officer in the Lebanese Army and a mother who was a school 
teacher; Earned a PhD in Psychology; Worked as a psychologist, university instructor, 
and consultant; And was the founder and managing partner for my own consulting, 
training, and recruitment company that served the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 
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region. In Canada, I pursued my second PhD in International Business and Strategy that I 
am completing now, worked as a research assistant, and lived in London, Ontario for 
around six years. 
In Lebanon, I experienced firsthand how a business and government system that 
is usually considered to be closer to a relation-based governance system works. In 
Canada, I experienced firsthand as well how a different business and government system 
that is usually considered to be closer to a rule-based governance system works (Li, Park, 
& Li, 2004). 
These contrasting experiences definitely enriched and broadened my 
understanding of corporate governance in general and comparative governance 
mechanisms and practices in particular. However, I am an international business and 
strategy scholar and I believe rule-based governance mechanisms and practices provide a 
more efficient and a better environment for international business, foreign trade, and 
strategic planning and management. Accordingly, I may be potentially biased in favor of 
rule-based governance mechanisms and practices whether within MNEs or across 
countries. Nevertheless, I hope that my potential biases have been mitigated by my 
rigorous striving to collect and analyze my data with reflexive thought and honest 
introspection. 
 
3.2. Results 
This section consists of two subsections, a quantitative results subsection and a 
qualitative results subsection. 
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3.2.1. Quantitative Results 
This subsection presents this study’s quantitative results. I used survival analysis, 
namely the extended Cox regression technique, to test my hypotheses. An extended Cox 
model is appropriate because the dependent variable is survival likelihood and the 
independent and control variables are time-varying and the extended Cox model can 
incorporate and test for such time-dependent covariates (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005). 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the study 
variables. This correlation matrix shows that, among all covariates, there are only two 
correlations slightly above 0.5, namely the correlation between Inflation Rate and Lg 
Host Market Size and the correlation between Lg Expatriate Number and Lg Subsidiary 
Employees. However, even these two correlations are below 0.6, which suggests that 
multicollinearity should not be a concern. Nevertheless, there are several covariates that 
are significantly correlated (p < 0.05). Therefore to ensure the absence of 
multicollinearity and ensure the robustness of the results, I performed regressions and 
collinearity diagnostics for all covariates one by one. That is, I regressed each covariate 
on all the other covariates to get all their variance inflation factors (VIFs). All VIFs were 
below two which ensures that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in the analyses 
(Field, 2009). 
I test my hypotheses using a four-stage hierarchical extended Cox regression 
model. Table 3.2 presents the findings, in which my Risk Orientation construct is 
operationalized as Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio, Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio 
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Squared, and Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio Cubed. All four models are highly 
significant (p < 0.001) and the -2 Log Likelihood decreases as one moves from Model 1 
to Model 4. This suggests that each model fits the data better than the previous models. 
The full model, Model 4 in Table 3.2, shows that all hypotheses were supported. For the 
interpretation of results, a coefficient estimator with a negative value suggests a 
decreased likelihood of foreign subsidiary exit or an increase in likelihood of foreign 
subsidiary survival. 
Model 1 is the baseline model. It includes only control variables. Among the 
subsidiary-level controls, as expected, Model 1 shows that a foreign subsidiary’s age 
(measured as Log of subsidiary age) and size (as measured by its Log of subsidiary 
number of employees) are respectively marginally and highly significantly related to its 
survival likelihood (p < 0.10 and p < 0.001 respectively). Moreover, the sector in which a 
subsidiary operates is significantly associated with that subsidiary’s survival likelihood, 
since the reference sector, manufacturing, in this categorical variable is significantly 
related to foreign subsidiary survival likelihood (p < 0.001). The results show that 
Trading subsidiaries are significantly more likely to survive than their manufacturing 
counterparts (p < 0.001 and B is negative) and Services and Others subsidiaries are 
marginally more likely to survive than their manufacturing counterparts (p < 0.10 and B 
is negative). This may be attributed to the fact that Trading and Services subsidiaries 
require less capital investment to survive (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 
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Table ‎3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 SubsidiaryExit .043 .202            
2 LgSubsidiaryAge 1.105 .332 .016           
3 LgSubsidiaryEmployees 1.520 .821 -.105** .275**          
4 SubsidiarySector 1.834 .686 -.007 -.023 -.375**         
5 LgParentEmployees 4.018 .653 .033 .226** .304** -.075**        
6 ParentROA .028 .051 -.043 -.052* .087** -.050* -.016       
7 LgHostMarketSize 4.384 .111 -.014 .262** .086** -.065** -.107** .209**      
8 HostMarketPotential 1.461 2.041 .056* .177** .100** -.018 .024 -.078** -.052*     
9 InflationRate 2.170 1.166 -.032 .059* .001 -.015 -.072** .192** .586** -.271**    
10 LgParentOwnershipRatio 1.908 .175 -.091** .017 -.155** .220** -.082** .018 .023 -.018 .037   
11 LgExpatriateNumber .450 .338 -.146** .112** .587** -.194** .220** .052* -.072** .015 -.056* .098**  
12 ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio 1.006 .284 .067** .014 -.034 -.020 .261** -.450** -.218** -.029 -.099** -.110** .068** 
13 ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioSquared 1.093 .539            
14 ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioCubed 1.250 .847            
15 SubsidiaryAge 15.279 10.883            
16 SubsidiaryEmployees 143.815 323.992            
17 ParentEmployees 29305.079 52613.260            
18 HostMarketSize 25101.003 7564.709            
19 ParentOwnershipRatio 85.064 24.001            
20 ExpatriateNumber 2.925 4.125            
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).            
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).            
 Number of observations = 1621; 
Number of Canadian subsidiaries = 196; 
Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 142; 
Number of Canadian subsidiary Exits = 69 
            
 Note: Variables 13 to 20 show descriptive statistics for the ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio squared and cubed and for several other variables in their raw form 
before being log transformed; only variables 1-14 are part of the Cox Regression model. 
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Table ‎3.2 Hierarchical Extended Cox Regression Predicting Subsidiary Exit 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE 
Control Variables             
LgSubsidiaryAge -.991 + .602 -1.570 * .617 -1.632 ** .623 -1.680 ** .618 
LgSubsidiaryEmployees -.825 *** .146 -.459 * .184 -.435 * .183 -.497 ** .184 
SubsidiarySector (Manufacturing: Reference)  ***   *   **   **  
SubsidiarySector (Trading) -1.195 *** .305 -.873 ** .313 -.973 ** .321 -1.064 *** .328 
SubsidiarySector (Services and Others) -.514 + .307 -.202  .333 -.191  .333 -.232  .334 
LgParentEmployees .332 + .198 .073  .220 .123  .227 .166  .214 
ParentROA .372  2.605 3.489  3.759 3.762  3.547 6.324 ** 2.288 
LgHostMarketSize -18.562 *** 3.936 -17.471 *** 3.854 -17.220 *** 3.887 -17.194 *** 3.830 
HostMarketPotential -.144 + .086 -.132  .087 -.136  .086 -.137  .086 
InflationRate .209  .133 .181  .134 .179  .134 .181  .132 
Main Variables             
LgParentOwnershipRatio    -1.546 ** .522 -1.538 ** .514 -1.544 ** .512 
LgExpatriateNumber    -1.909 *** .566 -1.887 *** .571 -2.023 *** .573 
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio    1.127 + .600 -3.030  2.574 20.879 * 9.585 
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioSquared       2.223  1.365 -25.193 * 10.120 
ParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatioCubed          9.727 ** 3.438 
             
- 2 Log-Likelihood 760.817   731.636   729.152   721.211   
Model Chi-Square 138.564 ***  169.461 ***  173.328 ***  180.504 ***  
Number of observations = 1621; 
Number of Canadian subsidiaries = 196; 
Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 142; 
Number of Canadian subsidiary Exits = 69 
           
+ p < .10;  * p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001 (all two-tailed) 
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In this baseline model, among the parent-level controls, parent size (as measured 
by the Log of parent number of employees) is marginally negatively related to subsidiary 
survival (p < 0.10). This relationship shows that foreign subsidiaries of smaller MNEs are 
more likely to survive than those of larger MNEs (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj & 
Beamish, 2009). This is consistent with Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) organizational 
complexity notion, which suggests that while parent size provides a stronger resource 
base it increases vulnerability to local demands. It is also in line with Franko’s (1971) 
findings that suggest that MNEs with larger parents have more flexibility to structure 
their operations in a country. Larger firms have a greater ability to move subsidiaries to 
new locations within a country or region and consolidate several subsidiaries into a single 
unit, thus decreasing the likelihood of their foreign subsidiaries’ survival (Chung, Lee, 
Beamish, & Isobe, 2010). Meanwhile, parent performance (as measured by their ROA) 
had no observable relationship with subsidiary survival. 
Among the country-level controls, as expected, a subsidiary’s host market size (as 
measured by the Log of the host market’s per capita GDP) and host market potential (as 
measured by the host market’s percentage change in GDP) were respectively highly and 
marginally related to subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 and p < 0.10 respectively). This 
suggests that foreign subsidiaries operating in larger markets and in markets that have a 
higher potential for growth are more likely to survive than their counterparts operating in 
smaller markets and in markets that have a lower potential for growth. However, in this 
baseline model, host market inflation rate was not significantly related to subsidiary 
survival. This may be due to the fact that the relation between host market inflation and 
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subsidiary survival is an indirect one. Inflation usually decreases market growth which is 
expected to ultimately decrease subsidiary survival. 
Model 2 includes the two independent variables, parent ownership ratio and 
expatriate number, and the linear form of the third independent variable, parent sector-
adjusted debt ratio, in addition to the control variables in Model 1. The results of the 
controls in Model 2 are broadly similar to those in Model 1 except for the parent size 
variable. The relationship between this control and subsidiary survival likelihood 
becomes non-significant (p > 0.10). 
More importantly, Model 2 shows, as expected, that there is a significant 
logarithmic relationship between a parent’s ownership level in its foreign subsidiary and 
that foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.01). Furthermore, it also shows that 
there is a significant logarithmic relationship between the number of expatriates in a 
foreign subsidiary and that subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.001). These two results 
clearly support the first two sub-hypotheses, namely H1a and H2a. They demonstrate that 
as parent ownership and number of expatriates in a subsidiary increase and agency 
problems decrease, subsidiary self-serving behaviors decline. However they decline at a 
decreasing rate, as increments in the ownership levels and expatriate numbers in the 
lower end will have a larger impact in reducing potential for subsidiary self-serving 
behavior, and thus agency costs, than similar ones at the higher end. Consequently, 
increments in the ownership levels and expatriate numbers in the lower end will have a 
larger impact in increasing subsidiary survival than similar ones at the higher end. In 
addition, Model 2 shows that there is only a marginal relationship between the linear 
form of the third independent variable, parent sector-adjusted debt ratio, and foreign 
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subsidiary survival likelihood. This suggests that basically there is no linear relationship 
between parent risk orientation and foreign subsidiary survival likelihood. 
Model 3 includes the parent sector-adjusted debt ratio squared variable on top of 
the variables in Model 2. The results of the variables (controls and independent variables) 
in Model 3 are generally similar to the ones in Model 2 except for the linear form of the 
parent sector-adjusted debt ratio. In Model 3 this variables became non-significant (p > 
0.1). More importantly, Model 3 shows that there is no significant relationship between 
the quadratic form of the third independent variable, parent sector-adjusted debt ratio 
squared, and foreign subsidiary survival likelihood. This suggests that there is no 
significant quadratic relationship between parent risk orientation and foreign subsidiary 
survival likelihood. 
Model 4 includes the parent sector-adjusted debt ratio cubed variable on top of the 
variables in Model 3. The results of the variables (controls and independent variables) in 
Model 4 are broadly similar to the ones in Model 3 except for the parent performance (as 
measured by parent ROA) variable. In this model, parent performance was significantly 
negatively related to foreign subsidiary survival likelihood (p < 0.01). Similar to Franko’s 
(1971) findings, this can be attributed to the fact that better performing parents have more 
flexibility to structure and move their subsidiaries within a country and to consolidate 
subsidiaries into a single unit. 
Most interestingly, Model 4 clearly shows that once parent sector-adjusted debt 
ratio cubed is included in this full model, all three relationships between the three parent 
sector-adjusted debt ratio variables (parent sector-adjusted debt ratio, parent sector-
adjusted debt ratio squared, and parent sector-adjusted debt ratio cubed) and foreign 
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subsidiary survival likelihood, become significant (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 
respectively). Adding this last cubed variable to the model made all three risk orientation 
variables significant when previously the first two risk orientation variables were 
respectively only marginally significant and non-significant. This supports the argument 
that the relationship between risk orientation and subsidiary survival is a cubic and not a 
linear or quadratic one. The positive and negative values of the coefficients of the three 
risk orientation variables suggest that the relationship between parent risk orientation and 
foreign subsidiary survival likelihood has an s-shaped form (see Figure 3.1 for a graph of 
the relationship between risk orientation and subsidiary exit likelihood; The relationship 
between risk orientation and subsidiary survival likelihood would have an inverse graph 
but because of the data’s structure I could only draw the graph of the subsidiary exit 
relationship in Figure 3.1). This clearly supports the third sub-hypothesis, H3a. 
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Figure ‎3.1 Relationship between Risk Orientation (as an MNE Parent-Foreign Subsidiary 
Governance Mechanism) and Subsidiary Exit Likelihood 
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3.2.2. Qualitative Results 
“I don't believe that there is a direct correlation between governance and 
profitability. I think it is the other way around. It is more of a null hypothesis. There is a 
correlation between governance and lack of failure.” – Robert G. Bertram 
 
This subsection presents this study’s qualitative results. The purpose of my 
qualitative analysis was to provide a better understanding of how and why the use of 
subsidiary-level and parent-level foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms, such as 
ownership, expatriates, and risk orientation, increase the survival likelihood and 
profitability of foreign subsidiaries of MNEs. 
First, my interviews corroborated my quantitative findings in that most of my 
participants believed that foreign subsidiaries that are more likely to survive are governed 
by their MNE parents through higher parent ownership, higher number of expatriates, and 
lower risk as MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms. These qualitative 
findings were consistent with my quantitative results. 
Second, these interviews complemented my quantitative findings in that they 
clarified how subsidiaries that are more likely to survive are governed by their parents 
and why they are governed that way. For instance, one participant explained that 
subsidiaries “would survive better because there will be insurance of compliance with 
[host country and parent country regulations], in other words, the risk of fines or penalties 
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would be mitigated because somebody [i.e. the parent] was making sure that they’re in 
compliance with their regulatory environment.” 
Furthermore, one subsidiary general manager, who served as a subsidiary 
manager in more than one country for a very well-known and -respected MNE, believed 
that there absolutely was a relationship between higher parent ownership in a foreign 
subsidiary and higher foreign subsidiary survival likelihood. He explained that, compared 
to independent distributors of foreign MNEs, “we were willing to take losses in certain 
[wholly-owned subsidiaries] in order to have a longer term horizon that would make 
these [temporarily losing wholly owned subsidiaries] profitable over the long run. The 
company [i.e. the MNE] was willing to invest for the longer term whereas an independent 
distributor just would not be doing that.” 
A subsidiary general manager, who himself was an expatriate, also explained how 
using expatriates as a subsidiary governance mechanism increased subsidiaries’ survival 
likelihoods at his parent corporation. He explained that in his parent corporation, they 
usually send expatriates to establish foreign subsidiaries. Once the subsidiary’s 
performance is on track they are fine with locals running the subsidiary. In that case, they 
still have expatriate teams go on short assignments to audit the behavior and performance 
of the subsidiary on a biennial basis. However, when a subsidiary is not behaving or 
performing as expected, such as not following the parent’s policies or meeting the 
parent’s targets, one or more expatriates are sent to fix these problems by reinforcing the 
parent’s culture and expectations. 
In addition, another subsidiary CEO, whose company was number two in its 
industry worldwide, suggested that, following his parent’s risk guidelines, his subsidiary 
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took moderate risks (for example, customer financing risks), “very similar to industry risk 
norms taken by our top two competitors but did not take extreme risks similar to the ones 
taken by our number four, five, and six competitors. Nevertheless we were more flexible 
than our number one competitor. [For example, we would do] letter of credit or just 
invoice, but we would never do a consignment shipment, never!” He added “since we 
were not outside of range of our competition, this was fine.” This interview anecdotally 
confirmed my quantitative findings related to the impact of risk orientation on subsidiary 
survival and briefly described certain types of subsidiary risks that would threaten these 
subsidiaries’ survival. 
 
What was most interesting was the quote provided at the beginning of this section. 
This quote was provided by Robert G. Bertram, an extremely experienced governance 
expert who has been a director on over 12 company boards. This quote suggested that 
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms may impact foreign subsidiary 
survival but not necessarily impact foreign subsidiary profitability. Thus, it prompted me 
to test, not only for the relationship between MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
mechanisms and foreign subsidiary survival, but also for the relationship between these 
governance mechanisms and foreign subsidiary profitability. Testing for both of these 
relationships using the small Canadian subsidiaries sample showed that although 
governance impacts survival it may not necessarily impact profitability. However, given 
that the Canadian sample was a small sample, and that testing for no governance-
profitability relationship (i.e. arguing and testing for the null hypothesis) required a big 
enough sample to ensure enough statistical power, I embarked on testing this relationship 
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more formally in the main study in the next chapter. Therefore the next chapter presents 
the methods and results related to testing for the relationships between governance and 
survival on the one hand and governance and profitability on the other hand using a large 
multi-country study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. MAIN MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY: METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
This main study constitutes of two sub-studies, a multi-country survival analysis 
and a multi-country profitability analysis. 
 
4.1. Multi-Country Survival Analysis 
4.1.1. Methods 
4.1.1.1. Sample and Data 
The purpose of this analysis was to address the first research question (‘How do 
MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries to ensure better performance measured as 
foreign subsidiary survival and foreign subsidiary profitability?’) using a large 
longitudinal sample of Japanese MNEs with subsidiaries in multiple countries and 
regions from 1990 till 2008. This multi-country survival analysis tested Hypotheses 1a, 
2a, 3a, 4a, and 5. It used a very large sample compiled from the TK dataset, NEEDS 
databases, World Bank economic and governance data, and Centre d’Etudes Prospectives 
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) data. The objectives were to 1) confirm the 
generalizability of the corresponding survival analysis findings from the Canadian pilot 
study for hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a, and 2) broaden the analysis to include a fourth 
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanism, regional headquarters (RHQ) 
(H4a), and the interaction between ownership and expatriates. 
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4.1.1.2. Variables 
Dependent Variable (DV) 
Subsidiary Exit: Following previous studies on subsidiary survival (Dai et al., 
2013), this study’s dependent variable Subsidiary Exit is an indicator variable, SubExit, 
that takes a value of 1 if subsidiary x exits at time t, and 0 if it remains (survives). 
Observations start in 1990, and continue until an exit occurs, or they are right-censored in 
2008. I follow Delios and Beamish (2001) in treating delisted subsidiaries from the 
sample as exits, because the TK dataset is almost exhaustive for all cases of Japanese 
FDI. This approach has been validated by Delios and Beamish (2004) in which they 
compared identified cases of exit in the TK dataset with reported cases of exit. For the 
period 1990–2008 there were 2,757 identified exits out of 12,101 foreign subsidiaries and 
a total of 84, 369 observations. 
Independent Variables (IVs) and Modifier Variable (MV) 
Ownership Ratio: Consistent with previous research ownership ratio is measured 
as the logarithm of the percentage of the focal subsidiary’s equity owned by the largest 
Japanese owner. The largest Japanese owner is used because typically it is considered the 
Japanese parent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). 
Expatriate Number: This thesis theorizes expatriate number simultaneously as 
an independent variable (main variable) and a modifier variable that amplifies 
(strengthens) the effect of ownership ratio on foreign subsidiary survival. Consistent with 
previous research (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Plourde et al., 
2013) I measure expatriate number as the logarithm of the number of expatriates in the 
76 
 
 
subsidiary to test for the nonlinear logarithmic relationship between expatriate number 
and foreign subsidiary survival. 
Risk Orientation: I measured risk orientation as the Japanese parent’s sector-
adjusted debt ratio. To calculate this measure I first calculated the Japanese parent’s debt 
ratio (i.e. total liabilities divided by total assets). Second, I calculated the debt ratio for 
each of the three sectors: Manufacturing, Trade, and Services & Others (see next page for 
a detailed description of sector) by adding the debt ratios of all the Japanese parents in a 
sector and dividing their total by the number of parents in that sector. Finally, I divided 
each Japanese parent’s debt ratio by its sector’s debt ratio to get each firm’s sector-
adjusted debt ratio. Then, I log-transformed the sector-adjusted debt ratio to test the 
hypothesized nonlinear logarithmic relationship between risk orientation and survival. 
Using a firm’s sector-adjusted debt ratio as a proxy to measure its risk orientation is 
appropriate for several reasons. First, firm debt ratios have been used in the literature to 
measure firm risk (Abor, 2007; Beaver et al., 1970; Berger et al., 1997; Friend & Lang, 
1988; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wen et al., 2002). Second, among the other available 
debt ratio measures, I selected the total liabilities divided by total assets measure as it has 
been shown to exhibit the highest association with risk (Beaver, 1966). Third, the pilot 
study’s analysis of Canadian subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs found that sector appears to 
influence governance mechanisms in general (Coles et al., 2001) and corporate debt 
ratios in Japan in particular (Remmers et al., 1974). 
Subsidiary Governed by Regional Headquarters (RHQ): I measure this 
variable as an indicator variable. 1 indicates that the Japanese MNE parent has a RHQ in 
the region in which the MNE parent’s foreign subsidiaries operate and suggests that that 
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parent’s subsidiaries in that region are governed by a RHQ. 0 indicates that the Japanese 
MNE parent does not have a RHQ in the region in which the MNE parent’s foreign 
subsidiaries operate and suggests that that parent’s subsidiaries in that region are not 
governed by a RHQ. To identify world regions I follow Delios and Beamish (2005) and 
consider the world to consist of seven geographic regions, namely Africa, Asia, Europe, 
Latin America, Middle East & North Arica (MENA), North America, and Oceania.  
Control Variables 
This study controlled for several variables that the literature suggests may be 
possible alternative explanations for subsidiary survival and that could consequently 
confound my results. First, at the subsidiary level, I controlled for the following 
variables. 
Subsidiary age: Consistent with (Dai et al., 2013) I controlled for subsidiary age 
to account for (1) the possible effect of the liability of newness and (2) the possible effect 
of the ability of older subsidiaries to adapt to host-country conditions, on subsidiary 
survival. Subsidiary age was measured as the logarithm of the number of years a 
subsidiary has operated since its date of establishment in the host country. 
Subsidiary Size: I controlled for subsidiary size to account for liabilities of 
smallness and structural inertia since previous studies have shown a positive relationship 
between the size and survival of foreign subsidiaries (Li, 1995). Subsidiary size was 
measured as the logarithm of the total number of subsidiary employees. 
Subsidiary sector: I controlled for subsidiary sector. All the industries were 
grouped into 3 broad sectors (manufacturing = 1, trade = 2, and services & others =3). 
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Second, at the parent level, consistent with Kim et al. (2012) I controlled for 
Parent Size, Parent Performance, and Parent Sector since these variables are known to 
usually affect subsidiary survival (Delios & Beamish, 2001). Parent size was measured as 
the logarithm of the parent’s number of employees, parent performance, as the return on 
assets of the parent, and parent sector, as a categorical variables with manufacturing = 1, 
trade = 2, and services & others = 3. 
Third, at the country level, consistent with Dai et al. (2013), I controlled for Host 
Market Size, Host Market Potential, and Host Market Inflation Rate, factors expected to 
influence foreign subsidiary survival. Host market size was measured as the logarithm of 
host country per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Host market potential was 
measured as the percentage change in GDP of the host country from one year to the 
other. Host market inflation rate was measured as the inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %), 
for different years. 
I also controlled for Geographic Distance, Host Country Political Stability, and 
Geographic region. Geographic Distance measured the distance between Japan and the 
host country. I compiled this data from the GeoDist database published by the Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Information Internationale (CEPII). This dataset measures 
geographic distances between countries following the great circle formula, which uses 
latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities / agglomerations (in terms of 
population). 
 Host Country Political Stability ranked the political stability of all countries on a 
scale from 0 to 100 (World Bank Governance Indicators). Other World Bank Governance 
indicators, such as other political and legal governance indicators, were initially include 
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in the statistical models, however they were later remove due to potential 
multicollinearity problems. As implied above, Geographic Region was measured as a 
categorical variable with Africa = 1, Asia = 2, Europe = 3, Latin America = 4, Middle 
East & North Arica (MENA) = 5, North America = 6, and Oceania = 7. 
 
4.1.2. Results  
The purpose of this multi-country survival analysis was to investigate how 
Japanese MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries to ensure better foreign 
subsidiary survival. Survival analysis, namely the extended Cox regression technique, 
was used to test the hypotheses. An extended Cox model is appropriate because the 
dependent variable is foreign subsidiary survival likelihood and the independent and 
control variables are time-varying and the extended Cox model can incorporate and test 
for such time-dependent covariates (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005). 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for this study’s 
variables. This correlation matrix shows that, among all covariates, there are only four 
correlations above 0.5, namely the correlations between Log Host Market Size and 
Political Stability, Log Host Market Size and Subsidiary Geographic Region, Parent 
Sector and Subsidiary Sector, and Geographic Distance and Subsidiary Geographic 
Region. Several covariates are significantly correlated (p < 0.05). Therefore to ensure the 
absence of multicollinearity and ensure the robustness of my results, I performed 
regressions and collinearity diagnostics for all covariates one by one. That is, each 
covariate was regressed on all the other covariates to obtain all their variance inflation 
80 
 
 
factors (VIFs). All VIFs were below four which ensures that multicollinearity is unlikely 
to be an issue in the analyses (Field, 2009). 
Table 4.2 presents the Extended Cox Regression results. All 6 models are highly 
significant (p < 0.001) and the -2 Log Likelihood decreases as one moves from one 
Model to the next. All the changes in -2 Log Likelihood from one Model to the next are 
significant. These results suggest that each model fits the data significantly better than the 
previous models. The full model (Model 6) in Table 4.2, shows that all hypotheses, 
except the parent sector-adjusted debt ratio hypothesis, were fully supported. The parent 
sector-adjusted debt ratio hypothesis was only partially supported as it emerged as a 
nonlinear logarithmic relationship rather than the initially hypothesized nonlinear s-
shaped relationship. For the interpretation of results, a coefficient estimator with a 
negative value suggests a decreased likelihood of foreign subsidiary exit or an increased 
likelihood of foreign subsidiary survival. 
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Table ‎4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 SubExit .033 .178                 
2 LgSubAge .930 .403 -.008*                
3 LgSubEmployees 1.680 .794 -.066** .191**               
4 SubSector 1.762 .769 .033** .035** -.459**              
5 LgParentEmployees 3.774 .693 .014** .093** .334** -.016**             
6 ParentROA 3.230 5.452 -.050** .001 .006 -.018** -.048**            
7 ParentSector 1.415 .710 .038** .010** -.187** .596** -.116** -.033**           
8 LgHostMarketSize 3.928 .617 .026** .248** -.341** .252** -.060** .032** -.010**          
9 HostMarketPotential 3.675 3.927 -.009** -.195** .131** -.127** -.029** .100** -.003 -.387**         
10 InflationRate 14.187 155.194 -.002 .038** .017** -.018** .022** -.003 -.011** -.066** -.080**        
11 GeogDistance 6779.179 3880.884 .027** .227** -.174** .156** .067** -.014** -.020** .488** -.476** .192**       
12 PoliticalStability 57.537 25.409 .009** .116** -.292** .210** -.012** -.044** -.009** .751** -.294** -.071** .299**      
13 SubGeographicRegion 3.217 1.703 .028** .153** -.193** .152** -.007* -.012** -.008* .571** -.347** .024** .697** .355**     
14 LgParentOwnership 
Ratio 
1.841 .242 -.045** .026** -.223** .154** -.085** .050** -.041** .335** -.085** .007* .184** .241** .189**    
15 LgExpatNumber .561 .360 -.090** .121** .448** -.089** .250** -.015** -.078** .036** -.020** -.008* .042** .019** .049** .205**   
16 LgParentSector 
AdjustedDebtRatio 
.297 .073 .023** .002 .084** .011** .341** -.399** -.014** -.077** -.043** .027** .054** .027** .024** -.116** .087**  
17 SubGovernedByRHQ .271 .445 .000 -.007 .057** .022** .178** -.037** -.060** .021** .015** -.037** -.055** .036** -.040** -.024** .057** .105** 
18 SubAge 12.149 9.707                 
19 SubEmployees 233.595 917.450                 
20 ParentEmployees 20017.325 42091.172                 
21 HostMarketSize 17063.647 14693.117                 
22 ParentOwnershipRatio 77.464 28.441                 
23 ExpatNumber 4.537 9.524                 
24 ParentSectorAdjusted 
DebtRatio 
1.009 .323                 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 Number of observations = 84,369; 
Number of foreign subsidiaries = 12, 101; 
Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 1,540; 
Number of foreign subsidiary Exits = 2,757. 
 Note: Variables 18 to 24 show descriptive statistics for variables in their raw form before being log transformed; only variables 1-17 are part of the Cox Regression 
model. 
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Table ‎4.2 Hierarchical Extended Cox Regression Predicting Subsidiary Exit 
 Variables           Model 1           Model 2           Model 3           Model 4           Model 5           Model 6 
  B  SE  B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE 
 Control Variables                   
1 LgSubAge -2.90 *** .07 -2.90 *** .07 -2.99 *** .07 -2.99 *** .07 -2.99 *** .07 -3.00 *** .07 
2 LgSubEmployees -.63 *** .03 -.65 *** .03 -.38 *** .03 -.36 *** .03 -.36 *** .03 -.37 *** .03 
3 SubSector (Manufacturing: Reference)  ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***  
4 SubSector (Trading) -.48 *** .05 -.37 *** .05 -.28 *** .05 -.28 *** .05 -.27 *** .05 -.28 *** .05 
5 SubSector (Services & Others) -.12 † .07 .01  .07 .10  .07 .10  .07 .12 † .07 .11 † .07 
6 LgParentEmployees .33 *** .03 .28 *** .03 .32 *** .03 .26 *** .03 .27 *** .03 .27 *** .03 
7 ParentROA -.03 *** .00 -.03 *** .00 -.03 *** .00 -.02 *** .00 -.02 *** .00 -.02 *** .00 
8 ParentSector (Manufacturing: Reference)  ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***  
9 ParentSector (Trading) .65 *** .05 .51 *** .05 .51 *** .05 .53 *** .05 .53 *** .05 .54 *** .05 
10 ParentSector (Services & Others) .13 † .07 .04  .07 .04  .07 .03  .07 .02  .07 .03  .07 
11 LgHostMarketSize -.41 *** .07 -.32 *** .07 -.26 *** .07 -.22 *** .07 -.23 *** .07 -.24 *** .07 
12 HostMarketPotential .00  .01 .01  .01 .01  .01 .01  .01 .01  .01 .01  .01 
13 InflationRate .00 *** .00 .00 *** .00 .00 *** .00 .00 *** .00 .00 *** .00 .00 *** .00 
14 GeogDistance .00 *** .00 .00 *** .00 .00 ** .00 .00 ** .00 .00 ** .00 .00 ** .00 
15 PoliticalStabilityRank .01 *** .00 .01 *** .00 .01 *** .00 .01 *** .00 .01 *** .00 .01 *** .00 
16 SubGeographicRegion (Africa: Reference)  ***   ***   ***   ***   ***   ***  
17 SubGeographicRegion (Asia) -1.37 *** .28 -1.39 *** .28 -1.03 *** .28 -1.06 *** .28 -1.03 *** .28 -.98 *** .28 
18 SubGeographicRegion (Europe) -.53 * .25 -.56 * .25 -.38  .25 -.39  .25 -.36  .25 -.32  .25 
19 SubGeographicRegion (Latin America) .11  .25 .12  .25 .13  .25 .12  .25 .12  .25 .16  .25 
20 SubGeographicRegion (MENA) -.39  .31 -.50  .31 -.42  .31 -.45  .31 -.45  .31 -.43  .31 
21 SubGeographicRegion (North America) -.21  .25 -.27  .25 -.02  .25 -.06  .25 -.03  .25 .02  .25 
22 SubGeographicRegion (Oceania) -.91 *** .27 -.93 *** .27 -.78 ** .27 -.83 ** .27 -.82 ** .27 -.78 ** .27 
 Main Variables                   
23 LgParentOwnershipRatio    -1.04 *** .06 -.71 *** .07 -.68 *** .07 -.68 *** .07 -.91 *** .09 
24 LgExpatNumber       -1.27 *** .07 -1.28 *** .07 -1.29 *** .07 -2.72 *** .39 
25 LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio          1.80 *** .32 1.85 *** .32 1.81 *** .32 
26 SubGovernedByRHQ             -.09 * .04 -.09 * .04 
 Interaction                   
27 LgExpatNumber*LgParentOwnershipRatio                .80 *** .21 
 - 2 Log-Likelihood 54448.89   54231.45   53905.55   53873.54   53869.04   53854.34   
 Model Chi-Square 3588.19 ***  3879.88 ***  4105.56 ***  4118.09 ***  4122.97 ***  4230.00 ***  
 Change in - 2 Log-Likelihood 3288.07 ***  217.45 ***  325.90 ***  32.01 ***  4.49 *  14.70 ***  
 Number of observations = 84,369; Number of foreign subsidiaries = 12, 101; Number of Japanese parent MNEs = 1,540; Number of foreign subsidiary Exits = 2,757. 
 † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (all two-tailed)                
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Model 1 is the baseline model. It includes only control variables. Among the 
subsidiary-level controls, as expected, Model 1 shows that subsidiary age (as measured as 
Log of subsidiary age) and subsidiary size (as measured by its Log of subsidiary number 
of employees) are both positively significantly related to subsidiary survival likelihood (p 
< 0.001 for both). Moreover, subsidiary sector is significantly associated with subsidiary 
survival likelihood since the reference sector, manufacturing, is significantly related to 
foreign subsidiary survival likelihood (p < 0.001). The results show that Trading 
subsidiaries are significantly more likely to survive than their manufacturing counterparts 
(p < 0.001 and B is negative) and Services and Others subsidiaries are marginally more 
likely to survive than their manufacturing counterparts (p < 0.10 and B is negative). This 
may be attributed to the fact that Trading and Services subsidiaries require less capital 
investment to survive (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 
In this baseline model, among the parent-level controls, parent size (as measured 
by the Log of parent number of employees) is negatively significantly related to 
subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 and B is positive). This relationship shows that foreign 
subsidiaries of smaller MNEs are more likely to survive than those of larger MNEs 
(Delios & Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009). This is consistent with Kostova 
and Zaheer’s (1999) organizational complexity notion, which suggests that while parent 
size provides a stronger resource base, it increases vulnerability to local demands. It is 
also in line with Franko’s (1971) findings that suggest that MNEs with larger parents 
have more flexibility to structure their operations in a country. Larger firms have a 
greater ability to move subsidiaries to new locations within a country or region and 
consolidate several subsidiaries into a single unit, thus decreasing the likelihood of their 
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foreign subsidiaries’ survival (Chung et al., 2010). Moreover, as expected, parent 
performance (as measured by ROA) is positively significantly related with subsidiary 
survival. Furthermore, parent sector is significantly related to subsidiary survival 
(Manufacturing: p < 0.001) and subsidiaries with parents that are in the trading sector are 
less likely to survive (p < 0.001 and B is positive) and subsidiaries with parents that are 
in services and other sectors are marginally less likely to survive (p < 0.1 and B is 
positive) than subsidiaries with parents that are in the manufacturing sector.  
Among the country-level controls, as expected, a subsidiary’s host market size (as 
measured by the Log of the host market’s per capita GDP) and host market inflation rate 
were respectively negatively and positively related to subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 for 
both and Bs negative and positive respectively). Whereas, a subsidiary’s host market 
potential (as measured by the host market’s percentage change in GDP) had no 
observable relationship with a subsidiary’s survival (p > 0.1). 
Moreover, a subsidiary’s geographic distance from Japan was negatively related 
(p < 0.001 and B is positive) to a subsidiary’s survival. Unexpectedly, host country 
political stability was negatively related to subsidiary survival (p < 0.001 and B is 
positive). This may be attributed to the fact that subsidiaries operating in politically stable 
countries may be faced with stronger competition due to the attractiveness of operating in 
those countries which may increase their likelihood of failure compared to subsidiaries 
operating in politically unstable countries but prone to lower competition as well. 
Moreover, research shows that subsidiaries operating in more politically unstable 
countries may develop political experience and capabilities that may enhance their 
chances for survival (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Frynas & Mellahi, 2003). 
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Furthermore, a subsidiary’s geographic region was significantly related to a 
subsidiary’s survival likelihood (for the reference category, Africa, p < 0.001). The other 
categories of this variable show that, subsidiaries in Asia, Europe, and Oceania are 
significantly more likely to survive than their counterparts in Africa (p < 0.001, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.001 respectively and B is negative for all). 
Model 2 tests for H1a. It includes this study’s first main variable, log parent 
ownership ratio. The results of the controls in Model 2 are widely similar to those in 
Model 1. The results for log parent ownership ratio suggest that, as expected, there is a 
significant positive nonlinear logarithmic relationship between an MNE parent’s 
ownership ratio in its foreign subsidiary and that foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood 
(p < 0.001 and B is negative). Thus H1a is supported. 
Model 3 tests for H2a. It includes this study’s second main variable, log expatriate 
number. The results of the controls in Model 3 are widely similar to those in Model 1. 
The results for log expatriate number suggest that, as expected, there is a significant 
positive nonlinear logarithmic relationship between the number of expatriates in a foreign 
subsidiary and that foreign subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.001 and B is negative). 
Thus H2a is supported. 
Model 4 initially tested for H3a, namely that there is a negative (declining) 
nonlinear s-shaped relationship between an MNE parent’s sector-adjusted debt ratio and 
its foreign subsidiary’s survival. Given that parent sector-adjusted debt ratio squared and 
parent sector-adjusted debt ratio cubed were found non-significant in this multi-country 
sample, they are not reported in Table 4.2. However, Model 4 reports the coefficient of 
the relationship between log parent sector-adjusted debt ratio and foreign subsidiary 
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survival. This coefficient was found to be significant. The results of the controls in Model 
4 are widely similar to those in Model 1. The results for log parent sector-adjusted debt 
ratio suggest that there is a significant negative nonlinear logarithmic relationship 
between an MNE parent’s sector-adjusted debt ratio and its foreign subsidiary’s survival 
likelihood (p < 0.001 and B is positive). Thus H3a is partially supported since the 
relationship between parent risk orientation and subsidiary survival still emerged as 
significant negative nonlinear, although logarithmic rather than s-shaped in form. 
Model 5 tests for H4a. It includes this study’s fourth main variable, subsidiary 
governed by RHQ. The results of the controls in Model 5 are widely similar to those in 
Model 1. The results for subsidiary governed by RHQ suggest that, as expected, a foreign 
subsidiary that is governed by a RHQ is significantly more likely to survive than its 
counterpart that is not governed by a RHQ (p < 0.05 and B is negative). Thus H4a is fully 
supported. 
Model 6 tests for H5. It includes the effect of this study’s interaction between 
parent ownership ratio and expatriate number on foreign subsidiary survival. The results 
of the controls in Model 6 are widely similar to those in Model 1. The results for the 
interaction in Model 6 suggest that, as expected, the number of expatriates in a foreign 
subsidiary modifies (amplifies / strengthens) the positive effect of the MNE parent’s 
ownership ratio in that subsidiary on that subsidiary’s survival likelihood (p < 0.001 and 
B is positive). Thus H5 is fully supported. 
To probe this significant interaction further, three Cox regression models were run 
at three levels of the modifier variable, expatriate number. The first model was run at the 
low number of expatriates equal to zero expatriates (the values for this model are the ones 
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reported in Table 4.2). The second model was run at the medium number of expatriates 
equal to four expatriates. The number four expatriates was chosen because the mean 
number of expatriates in the sample was 4.537 and four expatriates was more 
theoretically meaningful than 4.537 given that human beings cannot be divided into parts. 
The third model was run at the high number of expatriates equal to eight expatriates to be 
equidistant from zero expatriates with respect to the closest number to the mean 
expatriate number, four expatriates. The regression coefficients for the parent ownership 
ratio variables at low expatriate number, medium expatriate number, and high expatriate 
number were Bat low expatriates = -0.909 (significant, p < 0.001), Bat medium expatriates =    -0.348 
(significant, p < 0.01), and Bat high expatriates = -0.148 (not significant, p > 0.1). 
These results suggest the following. When the number of expatriates is low, the 
effect of higher levels of parent ownership on subsidiary survival is high and significant 
(the slope between ownership and subsidiary failure is 0.909 and negative and 
significant). When the number of expatriates is medium, the effect of higher levels of 
parent ownership on subsidiary survival is medium and significant (the slope between 
ownership and subsidiary failure is 0.348 and negative and significant). When the number 
of expatriates is high, the effect of higher levels of parent ownership on subsidiary 
survival is low and non-significant (the slope between ownership and subsidiary failure is 
0.148 and negative and non-significant). Therefore, as the number of expatriates in a 
foreign subsidiary increases, the effect of higher parent ownership levels in that 
subsidiary on that subsidiary’s survival decreases. This further supports H5. 
To identify the relative importance of each main variable in explaining variability 
in the probability of foreign subsidiary survival, one needs to compare the changes in -2 
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log-likelihood resulting from the inclusion of each new main variable and interaction 
term in Table 4.2. -2 log-likelihood is a measure of how much unexplained variability 
there is in the dependent variable; therefore the difference or change in -2 log-likelihood 
indicates how much new variance has been explained by each new model (Field, 2009). 
Comparing the different changes in -2 Log-Likelihood resulting from the inclusion of 
each new main variable or interaction term in Table 4.2, one can notice the following. 
The relative importance of each variable, from the most important to the least important, 
in explaining new variance in the probability of foreign subsidiary survival, is as follows: 
expatriate number (change in -2 log-likelihood = 325.90, p < 0.001); parent ownership 
ratio (change in -2 log-likelihood = 217.45, p < 0.001); parent sector-adjusted debt ratio 
(change in -2 log-likelihood = 32.01, p < 0.001); interaction between ownership and 
expatriates (change in -2 log-likelihood = 14.70, p < 0.001); and subsidiary governed by 
RHQ (change in -2 log-likelihood = 4.49, p < 0.05). These results suggest that a change 
in the number of expatriates led to the highest change in the probability of  survival of a 
foreign subsidiary, whereas a change of a subsidiary from not being governed by an RHQ 
to being governed by an RHQ led to the lowest change in the probability of  survival of 
that foreign subsidiary. 
The same above analyses were replicated using a sample that included only 
subsidiaries with 20 employees or more and subsidiaries with Japanese parents with an 
ownership ratio of 5% or more. The same significant results were found for Log 
Ownership Ratio, Log Expatriate Number, Log Parent Sector-Adjusted Debt Ratio, and 
the interaction between Log Ownership Ratio and Log Expatriate Number. Only 
Subsidiary Governed by RHQ became non-significant. Upon further analysis, it was 
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found that RHQs had a median number of employees of 20 employees whereas 
subsidiaries that are not RHQ had a median number of employees equal to 45. Moreover, 
the total number of subsidiary-years that were RHQs was 9950, whereas the total number 
of subsidiary-years that were not RHQs was 213,133. When subsidiaries with fewer than 
20 employees were deleted around half of the RHQs in the sample were dropped, 
whereas far fewer non-RHQ subsidiaries were dropped from the original sample. 
These important changes in the relative percentages between RHQs and non-RHQ 
subsidiaries decreased the explanatory power of RHQs relative to non-RHQs. To avoid 
understating the impact of a subsidiary being governed by an RHQ on its survival, this 
study presents the results of the original sample in Table 4.2, especially that the results 
for the other main variables are the same for both. 
 
4.2. Multi-Country Profitability Analyses 
4.2.1. Methods 
This multi-country profitability analysis is in some ways similar to the multi-
country survival analysis, however using profitability, rather than survival, as the 
dependent variable, and using several cross-sections of the data, rather than longitudinal 
data, for the statistical analyses. The purpose of this analysis was to answer the second 
part of this thesis’ first research question (‘How do MNE parents govern their foreign 
subsidiaries to ensure better foreign subsidiary profitability?’) using a large sample of 
Japanese MNEs with subsidiaries in multiple countries and regions. To answer this part 
of the first research question, this study tested Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b using 
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several multinomial and binary logistic regression analyses. Thus, to test these 
hypotheses, one multinomial and one binary logistic regression analysis was conducted 
for each individual year from 2000 till 2008. That is, nine multinomial regressions and 
nine binary regressions, a total of 18 logistic regression analyses, were conducted to test 
for these four hypotheses. The purpose of repeating these regressions over 9 years was to 
ensure the robustness of the results. 
Using multinomial and binary logistic regression is appropriate because, as 
explained in more detail later, the dependent variable was correspondingly either a 
trichotomous or a dichotomous categorical variable. Multinomial logistic regression is 
appropriate for analyzing data with a categorical dependent variable with multiple 
categories. Binary logistic regression is appropriate for analyzing data with a categorical 
dependent variable with only two categories (Field, 2009). 
The data sources used to build the datasets utilized in these multi-country 
profitability logistic regression analyses were the same data sources employed to build 
the multi-country survival analyses, namely the TK, NEEDS, World Bank economic and 
governance data, and Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) data. The variables used in these multi-county profitability analyses were broadly 
similar to the variables used in the multi-country survival analyses, however the 
dependent variables were a trichotomous profitability dependent variable and a 
dichotomous profitability dependent variable (DV). The trichotomous profitability DV 
was measured as 1 = gain, 2 = breakeven, and 3 = loss. The dichotomous profitability DV 
was measured as 1 = gain and 0 = breakeven or loss. 
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The subsidiary profitability measure was based on a managerial assessment of 
profitability that has been demonstrated to have construct validity (Dess & Robinson, 
1984). The subsidiary’s general manager or the equivalent provided this assessment in 
response to a question in Toyo Keizai’s survey. The profitability question asked the 
subsidiary general manager to classify the financial performance of the subsidiary into 
one of three categories: loss, breakeven, or gain. The classification was an absolute 
assessment of profitability made without reference to other subsidiaries of the MNE to 
which the given subsidiary belonged. 
 
4.2.1.1. Testing Null Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b are essentially null hypotheses. In the strictest 
sense, the null hypothesis must always be false, because no two real-world measures have 
zero correlations between them (Lane et al., 1998). However, Field (2009) indicates that 
one can test null hypotheses and be confident enough to fail to reject (or “accept”) the 
null when the statistical test that one uses has enough statistical power to show that the 
relationship between two phenomena that was thought to be a true relationship is instead 
found to be trivial. He then defines the power of a statistical test as the probability that a 
given test will find an effect assuming that one exists in the population. He also provides 
guidelines, based on Cohen (1988, 1992), about the sample size recommended to achieve 
the desired level of power and to detect small, medium, and large effect sizes. He then 
recommends that statistical power be at least 0.8 (power = 1 – beta (0.2) = 0.8) so that 
one will be 80% confident that one will find an effect when it exists or that there will be 
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only 20% probability that one will make a Type II error of not detecting an effect when it 
actually exists. With 0.8 power and an alpha-level of 0.5 one would need 783 
observations to detect a small effect size (r = 0.1), 85 observations to detect a medium 
effect size (r = 0.3), and 28 observations to detect a large effect size (r = 0.5) (Field, 
2009). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that the sample size for the multi-country multinomial 
and binary profitability analyses for year 2005 was 877. The sample sizes for the 
replication analyses for years 2000 to 2008 ranged between 714 and 2021 observations. 
These sample sizes are either in the acceptable range or much larger than the sample size 
recommended to detect a small effect (r = 0.1) with 80% power. Thus, I can fail to reject 
(or “accept”) this study’s null hypotheses if no significant results are found. 
  
4.2.2. Results 
The descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations in Table 4.1 also apply to these 
multi-country profitability analyses since the same covariates are used in these analyses. 
Only SubExit, the multi-country survival analysis DV should be excluded from the table 
since the DVs for the current analyses are the trichotomous and dichotomous profitability 
DVs. Moreover, the sample sizes differ. 
Regarding the multinomial and binomial logistic regression results, Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 show the results for these analyses for the year 2005. I present the results of the 
year 2005 (before the global financial crisis) to avoid possible bias from use of data from 
years during or after that crisis. These tables clearly show that the overall models are 
significant. For the multinomial logit, Table 4.3 shows that Chi-square = 114.869 and is 
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highly significant (p < 0.001); and that R-square = 0.154. These results suggest that the 
model reasonably explains the variance in the DV. Furthermore, several control variables 
are significant. However, none of the main variables are significant. 
Similarly, for the binomial logit, Table 4.4 shows that Chi-square = 78.276 and is 
highly significant as well (p < 0.001); and that R-square = 0.122. These results also 
suggest that the model reasonably explains the variance in the DV. The explanatory 
power (R-square) decreased with the decrease in information in the DV (the DV changed 
from being trichotomous to being dichotomous). Furthermore, several control variables 
are significant. However, none of the main variables are significant. 
Although, for the sake of parsimony, I do not present the multinomial and 
binomial logistic regression results for all the years from 2000 to 2008, the results for 
these replication years are broadly similar to the results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Only in 
very few analyses, out of the total 18 analyses, did certain main variables appear 
marginally significant or significant. With the level of statistical power used, the ability 
to detect small effect sizes, and the replication of these results over several years and 
using two logistic regression techniques, these analyses allow me to fail to reject (or 
“accept”) the hypothesized null relationships. Thus, these results support H1b, H2b, H3b, 
and H4b. Specifically, these results provide evidence that ownership, expatriates, risk, 
and RHQ have negligible effects on foreign subsidiary profitability. 
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Table ‎4.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Subsidiary Profitability in 2005 
Variables B 
 
S.E. Exp(B) 
Gaining vs. Losing 
   Intercept 13.451*** 3.855
 
LgSubAge .657 * .335 1.929 
LgSubEmployees .520 * .262 1.682 
SubSector (Manufacturing) .477 
 
.498 1.610 
SubSector (Trading) .944 * .472 2.571 
SubSector (Reference: Services & Others) 
   
LgParentEmployees .534 * .263 1.706 
ParentROA .102 *** .026 1.107 
ParentSector (Manufacturing)  -.572 
 
.514 .564 
ParentSector (Trading) -.535 
 
.554 .586 
ParentSector (Reference: Services & Others)  
  
LgHostMarketSize .005 .753 1.005 
HostMarketPotential -.008 .088 .992 
InflationRate -.051 .073 .950 
GeogDistance .000 .000 1.000 
PoliticalStabilityRank .018 .012 1.019 
SubGeographicRegion (Asia) -14.529 *** 1.259 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (Europe) -15.551 *** 1.024 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America) -15.320 *** 1.444 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (MENA) -14.787 *** 1.871 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (North America) -15.176 *** .885 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (Reference: Oceania)  
  
LgParentOwnershipRatio -.948 
 
.702 .387 
LgExpatNumber -.262 
 
.495 .769 
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio 2.511 
 
1.835 12.322 
SubGovernedByRHQ (No) .038 
 
.296 1.039 
SubGovernedByRHQ (Reference: Yes) 
   
Breakeven vs. Losing 
   
Intercept 16.474 *** 4.147 
 
LgSubAge 1.065 ** .396 2.902 
LgSubEmployees .070 .295 1.072 
SubSector (Manufacturing) -.276 .558 .759 
SubSector (Trading) -.028 .529 .973 
SubSector (Reference: Services & Others)  
  
LgParentEmployees .084 .300 1.088 
ParentROA .028 .028 1.029 
ParentSector (Manufacturing)  .362 .571 1.436 
ParentSector (Trading) -.259 .630 .772 
ParentSector (Reference: Services & Others) 
 
 
  
LgHostMarketSize -.571 .815 .565 
HostMarketPotential .049 .100 1.050 
InflationRate -.039 .081 .961 
GeogDistance .000 .000 1.000 
PoliticalStabilityRank .026 * .013 1.027 
SubGeographicRegion (Asia) -15.325 *** 1.112 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (Europe) -15.418 *** .698 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America) -15.920 *** 1.362 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (MENA) -31.818 3518.233 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (North America) -15.545 .000 .000 
SubGeographicRegion (Reference: Oceaniab) 
 
 
  
LgParentOwnershipRatio -.997 .796 .369 
LgExpatNumber -.304 .562 .738 
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio 1.761 2.074 5.820 
SubGovernedByRHQ (No) .281 .345 1.325 
SubGovernedByRHQ (Reference: Yes)  
  
-2 Log-Likelihood = 1281.481; Chi-Square = 114.689***; Nagelkerke R-squared = .154 
Notes: Number of Observations = 877; Subsidiary Profitability was measured in 2005 and coded as 1 = Gaining; 2 = Breakeven; 3 = 
Losing; The reference category is 3 = Losing; All covariates were measured in 2004 to create a 1 year lag between covariates and 
dependent variable; SubGeographicRegion (Africa) is not in this model because there were no African subsidiaries with complete 
data in the analysis for 2004; + p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (All two-tailed). 
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Table ‎4.4 Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Subsidiary Profitability in 2005 
Varaibles B  S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant -2.795  1.912 .061 
LgSubAge .015  .233 1.015 
LgSubEmployees .472 ** .170 1.603 
SubSector (Reference: Manufacturing)  *   
SubSector (Trading) .291  .239 1.338 
SubSector (Services & Others) -.656 + .354 .519 
LgParentEmployees .483 ** .171 1.621 
ParentROA .084 *** .018 1.088 
ParentSector (Reference: Manufacturing)   *   
ParentSector (Trading) .435 + .237 1.545 
ParentSector (Services & Others) .799 * .365 2.224 
LgHostMarketSize .371  .469 1.449 
HostMarketPotential -.041  .057 .960 
InflationRate -.020  .042 .981 
GeogDistance .000  .000 1.000 
PoliticalStabilityRank .001  .008 1.001 
SubGeographicRegion (Reference: Asia)     
SubGeographicRegion (Europe) -.867 + .490 .420 
SubGeographicRegion (Latin America) -.273  1.010 .761 
SubGeographicRegion (MENA) .621  1.429 1.861 
SubGeographicRegion (North America) -.415  .632 .660 
SubGeographicRegion (Oceania) -.570  .779 .565 
LgParentOwnershipRatio -.321  .437 .725 
LgExpatNumber -.047  .318 .954 
LgParentSectorAdjustedDebtRatio 1.379  1.245 3.971 
SubGovernedByRHQ (Yes) .125  .202 1.133 
     -2 Log Likelihood = 982.640     
Chi-square = 78.276***     
Nagelkerke R-square = .122     
Number of Observations = 877     
     Notes: Subsidiary Profitability was measured in 2005 and coded as 1 = Gaining; 0 = 
Breakeven or Losing; All covariates were measured in 2004 to create a 1 year lag 
between the covariates and the dependent variable; SubGeographicRegion (Africa) is not 
in this model because there were no African subsidiaries with complete data in the 
analysis for 2004. 
+ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to answer the following research questions: (1) 
how do MNE parents govern their foreign subsidiaries to ensure better performance 
(measured as foreign subsidiary survival and foreign subsidiary profitability), (2) why 
they govern these foreign subsidiaries that way. I argued that MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance relationships are similar to principal-agent relationships, in that 
both need to reduce / solve the agency problem. Thus, I drew on agency theory to build 
my theoretical framework. 
To answer the first research question, agency theory and prospect theory based 
hypotheses were developed. Overall the statistical findings show that foreign subsidiaries 
that are more likely to survive are governed by MNE parents through a higher number of 
expatriates, higher parent ownership, lower risk, and regional headquarters (RHQ). 
Further, the relative importance of these governance mechanisms follows the descending 
order in which they are presented in the previous sentence. That is, the use of expatriates 
is the most effective governance mechanism whereas the use of RHQs is the least 
effective governance mechanism among these four significantly effective governance 
mechanisms. 
In addition, the findings suggest that the ownership and expatriates governance 
mechanisms complement each other. Specifically, the effect of a parent’s higher 
ownership on a subsidiary’s survival decreases as the number of expatriates in that 
subsidiary increases.  
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However, it is interesting that the findings show that although these four MNE 
parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms impact foreign subsidiary survival, 
they do not necessarily impact foreign subsidiary profitability. This finding quantitatively 
supports the qualitative insight provided by a seasoned governance expert whom I 
interviewed while collecting qualitative data for this thesis. 
To answer the second research question, I conducted interviews with subsidiary 
CEOs, TMT members, and board members. Consistent with agency theory, I found that 
MNE parents use ownership, expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ as foreign subsidiary 
governance mechanisms to monitor their foreign subsidiaries’ behaviors. However, 
beyond agency theory, but consistent with classical corporate governance, they use 
subsidiary governance mechanisms such as expatriates and risk orientation to also direct 
their foreign subsidiaries’ behaviors. 
 
5.1. Research Implications 
This study offers the following theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it 
contributes to agency theory by advancing it in the following ways. Classical economic 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) embraces the following assumptions, among 
others: (1) a single principal (shareholders), (2) a single agent (management), (3) the 
principal and the agent are two distinct individuals or groups (in the  case of two groups 
the individuals within each group have homogeneous interests, goals, and behaviors), and 
(4) the principal knows what is best for the firm and thus ideally creates an optimal 
contract that ensures that the agent does what the principal thinks is best for the firm and 
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then monitors the agent’s behavior (Shapiro, 2005). More recent agency theory research 
in economics, political science, law, sociology, and business extends the above first two 
assumptions and introduces multiple principals and multiple agents into agency-based 
studies (Kiser, 1999; Shapiro, 2005; Waterman & Meier, 1998). To my knowledge, this 
study is the first to combine agency theory and MNE corporate governance to explicitly 
extend the above third assumption by conceptualizing MNE-parent managers and foreign 
subsidiary expatriate managers as acting as principals and agents simultaneously.  
This study does this in the following two ways. Firstly, classical agency theory 
and corporate governance consider ownership as a governance mechanism used by 
shareholders (principals) to govern the behavior of managers (agents). This study extends 
agency theory by combining it with MNE governance to suggest that, in the context of 
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance, MNE-parent managers, who act 
simultaneously as agents to MNE shareholders and principals to foreign subsidiary 
managers, use foreign subsidiary ownership as a governance mechanism to govern the 
behavior of their foreign subsidiary managers. Domestic parent managers, who may also 
act simultaneously as agents to their shareholders and principals to their domestic 
subsidiary managers, may also use subsidiary ownership as a governance mechanism to 
govern the behavior of their domestic subsidiary managers. However, to my knowledge 
the literatures on international and domestic parent-subsidiary relationships neither 
explicitly extend this third assumption nor unambiguously consider MNE or domestic 
parent managers as acting as agents and principals simultaneously. Moreover, domestic 
parents and their domestic subsidiaries are less geographically, economically, politically, 
legally, etc. distant and are expected to have less divergent interests and goals than their 
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(MNE) parent-(foreign) subsidiary counterparts. This makes domestic parent-subsidiary 
agency problems minor compared to the more pronounced ones of their (MNE) parent-
(foreign) subsidiary counterparts. This, in turn, renders the simultaneous agent and 
principal roles of MNE parent managers much more salient than those of their domestic 
parent counterparts. Given that (MNE) parent-(foreign) subsidiary agency problems are 
more pronounced than those of their domestic parent-subsidiary counterparts I expect 
MNEs to rely more on subsidiary ownership as a subsidiary governance mechanism than 
their domestic counterparts, especially given that, with lower agency problems, domestic 
parents could govern their domestic subsidiaries by relying more on non-ownership 
governance mechanisms (Schaan, 1988). 
 Secondly, agency theory similarly considers managers as agents to owners or 
principals. This study extends agency theory and the expatriate literature by suggesting 
that expatriates, who are usually subsidiary managers, simultaneously act as agents 
(subsidiary managers) to headquarters and principals (subsidiary governors representing 
the parent) to foreign subsidiaries. Future research may need to investigate how such 
principal and agent managers resolve and integrate their personal internal agency 
conflicts. 
Furthermore, expatriates, being not only parent agents but simultaneously 
subsidiary principals, can go beyond agency theory’s prediction as acting only as parent 
controllers for their subsidiary’s behaviors, to having a role as governors of their 
subsidiary’s strategy. This extends the above fourth assumption of agency theory that 
predicts that the expatriate (agent) will be passive and just do what the parent believes is 
best for the subsidiary, to suggest that the expatriate will be proactive and do what (s)he 
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believes is best for the subsidiary and MNE parent overall. Such a proactive behavior 
would be more similar to corporate governance’s prediction that corporate board 
members act not only as monitors of management’s behavior but also as directors of 
corporate strategy. 
Second, this study contributes to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
by extending it from the individual level to the MNE parent-foreign subsidiary level. 
More specifically, prospect theory attempts to explain individual decisions under risk. 
This study extends it to an international business context to explain the relationship 
between MNE parent-foreign subsidiary risk orientation and foreign subsidiary survival. 
The pilot study advances prospect theory by showing when foreign subsidiaries behave in 
a rational manner and when they behave in a biased manner. It shows that moderate risk-
takers, that is rational actors, increase their survival likelihood by taking more moderate 
risks than their industry peers, whereas extreme risk-averters and excessive risk-seekers, 
that is biased actors, decrease their survival likelihood by increasing their risk-aversion 
and increasing their risk-seeking than their industry peers respectively.  
Third, this study contributes to corporate governance research by extending it in 
the following ways. Conceptually, it advances corporate governance studies by widening 
their scope to parent-subsidiary governance and broadening its mechanisms to include 
intra-organizational governance mechanisms, such as parent-subsidiary ownership, 
expatriates, risk orientation, and RHQ. The classical corporate governance literature 
typically studies internal (e.g. monitoring by the board of directors, compensation, 
internal audits, etc.) and external (e.g. market for corporate control, media pressure, 
government regulations, etc.) corporate governance mechanisms to the domestic firm. 
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This study extends the corporate governance literature by studying a third group of 
mechanisms, namely, intra-organizational governance mechanisms between parent and 
subsidiaries of the MNE. Moreover, conceptually it advances corporate governance by 
borrowing the concept of risk governance from sister disciplines such as political science 
and public policy and redefining it to serve as a valuable concept in corporate governance 
in the business sector. 
Empirically, it advances corporate governance research by conducting one of the 
first empirical and multi-method studies on MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance 
and by showing that MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance matters. However it was 
also found that MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance impacts foreign subsidiary 
survival but not necessarily foreign subsidiary profitability, a distinction that has not been 
made before either in the MNE governance literature or in the classical corporate 
governance literature. Previous findings on the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance have been mixed (for examples see: Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004; Larcker et al., 
2007). Making the distinction between these two kinds of performance may help explain 
why. Moreover, the few previous studies related to MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance and performance are mostly conceptual and / or qualitative (e.g. Adams, 
1996; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Kim et al., 2005; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). This study 
provides quantitative as well as qualitative evidence supporting the impact of subsidiary 
governance on subsidiary survival but not profitability. Furthermore, it empirically 
advances the field of MNE and subsidiary governance by utilizing advanced multi-
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methods, including advanced survival analysis logistic regression methods that have not 
been used in this area before. 
In addition, empirically the pilot study advances risk research by showing that the 
relationship between firm risk and survival is nonlinear rather than linear. This may 
explain why previous findings on the relationship between risk and performance are 
contradictory (for examples see: Bowman, 1980; Fama & French, 1992; Fletcher, 2000; 
Henkel, 2009; Nickel & Rodriguez, 2002; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1991). This may also 
reconcile the findings of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that suggest that the 
relationship between risk and performance is positive (Sharpe, 1964) and the findings of 
Bowman’s paradox that suggest that the relationship between risk and performance is 
negative (Bowman, 1980) by explaining the conditions that change the sign of this 
relationship. 
 
5.2. Practical Implications 
This study offers practical implications for directors and managers. The findings 
can help MNE and subsidiary directors and managers make better MNE parent-foreign 
subsidiary governance decisions. For instance, the first finding shows that a parent’s level 
of ownership in its foreign subsidiary increases the survival likelihood of that subsidiary 
although at a decreasing rate. This broadly suggests that if MNE directors and managers 
want to increase the survival likelihood of their foreign subsidiaries they would be 
advised to have a higher level of ownership as a governance mechanism in these 
subsidiaries. However, the marginal utility of increasing their level of ownership in these 
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foreign subsidiaries decreases as their ownership in these subsidiaries increases. Thus 
they may wish to operate international joint ventures (IJVs) in which they own a material 
equity share, as well as wholly owned subsidiaries. These recommendations are 
consistent with previous findings that suggest once an MNE parent owns 40% or more in 
an IJV, the survival likelihood of that IJV is not much different than that of a wholly 
owned subsidiary (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004).  
The second finding shows that the number of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary 
increases the survival likelihood of a subsidiary although at a decreasing rate. This 
broadly suggests that having more expatriates in a foreign subsidiary would generally 
increase the survival likelihood of that subsidiary, however beyond an optimal number of 
expatriates, the marginal subsidiary survival benefit of having an additional expatriate in 
the subsidiary decreases gradually.  This may be attributed to the high cost of expatriates 
relative to their marginal benefit as their number increases in subsidiaries. This finding is 
consistent with previous findings suggesting broadly that the number or percentage of 
expatriates positively influences subsidiary performance (Fang, Jiang, Makino, & 
Beamish, 2010; Gong, 2003; Very, Hébert, & Beamish, 2004). However, some studies 
suggest that MNEs may be gradually using fewer conventional expatriates in their foreign 
subsidiaries (Beamish & Inkpen, 1998; Collings et al., 2007; Kobrin, 1988) for various 
reasons. Therefore one must view this suggestion as a broad recommendation and must 
consider all the idiosyncrasies of each subsidiary and the availability, cost, and other 
limits on the use of expatriates before deciding on the specific number of expatriates to 
send to each subsidiary. 
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The third finding, from the main study, suggests that an MNE parent’s level of 
risk decreases the survival likelihood of its foreign subsidiaries, although at a decreasing 
rate. Thus, if MNE directors and managers want to increase the survival likelihood of 
their foreign subsidiaries they would be advised to follow a risk-averse or moderate risk 
taking orientation as opposed to an excessive risk-seeking orientation, at the headquarters 
as well as at the subsidiary level (see Figure 3.1). 
The fourth finding indicates that foreign subsidiaries governed by RHQ are more 
likely to survive than their counterparts that are not governed by RHQ. This provides an 
internal additional benefit to the use of RHQs. 
The fifth finding, related to the relative importance of the different MNE parent-
foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms, suggests that if directors and managers want 
to benefit from a larger governance impact on foreign subsidiary survival, they may want 
to use the most effective among the governance mechanisms investigated in this thesis, 
namely expatriates. However, if they are content with smaller governance impact that 
would still influence foreign subsidiary survival, it may be sufficient to use RHQs as 
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms.  
The sixth finding, that the ownership and expatriates governance mechanisms 
interact with each other to influence foreign subsidiary survival, suggests that directors 
and managers may substitute / complement ownership with expatriates and vice versa to 
impact subsidiary survival. This may further suggest that broadly directors and managers 
may be able to substitute / complement certain governance mechanisms with others to 
impact firm performance in general. 
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The final interesting finding is that, although MNE parent-foreign subsidiary 
governance mechanisms impact foreign subsidiary survival, they do not necessarily 
impact foreign subsidiary profitability. This finding may be attributed to the fact that 
governance mechanisms consistently discipline a company and ensure that it does not 
make decisions that are detrimental to its survival. However, a company needs a 
sustained entrepreneurial spirit to grow and prosper financially. 
 
5.3. Limitations and Future Directions 
This thesis has the following limitations. First, one limitation of this thesis is 
related to its subsidiary performance measures. One way this thesis measures subsidiary 
performance is as subsidiary survival. Although this is a legitimate measure for longer 
term firm performance (Combs, Crook, & Shook, 2005; Fischer & Pollock, 2004) that 
has been used in numerous studies (e.g. Delios and Beamish (2001), Gaur and Lu (2007), 
Kim et al. (2012), etc.), a limitation of this thesis’ data is that the data does not 
differentiate between subsidiary exits due to dissolution or underperformance on the one 
hand and those due to divestiture even when the subsidiary is performing well on the 
other. Future research may need to account for this distinction, although one would 
expect the number of exits due to divestiture when a subsidiary is performing well to be 
small relative to the number of exits due to the other two reasons. As a matter of fact, 
previous research on intended and unintended IJV and wholly owned subsidiary 
termination provides evidence that most IJVs are terminated due to unintended business 
failure and that IJV parents usually do not terminate successful joint ventures. Further, 
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changes in external conditions (misleading demand and competition from local firms) are 
the generic causes of unintended termination for all types of foreign subsidiaries, IJVs 
and wholly owned subsidiaries (Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007). 
Moreover, another way this thesis measures subsidiary performance is as 
subsidiary profitability. In this thesis subsidiary profitability is measured as a 
trichotomous or dichotomous categorical variable indicating the subsidiary manager’s 
report of whether the subsidiary has gained, broke-even, or lost during a specific period. 
Future research may need to measure subsidiary performance using continuous variables 
such as subsidiary growth or market share to capture more information in the subsidiary 
performance variable and consequently provide better governance-performance 
predictions. One of the limitations of this thesis data is that it did not provide subsidiary 
market share data. 
Second, the findings of this thesis provide general recommendations on how 
MNE parents can use select MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance mechanisms to 
improve their foreign subsidiaries’ survival. To provide such general recommendations 
this thesis controls for a range of variables that may vary among subsidiaries. However, it 
does not consider conditions that predict when to use which governance mechanism. The 
purpose of this thesis was to provide mainly (because it also provides at least one 
contingency performance prediction) universalistic, as compared to contingency or 
configurational, performance predictions (Delery & Doty, 1996). These mainly 
universalistic findings can be foundational for more contingency and configurational 
MNE parent-foreign subsidiary governance-performance future research predictions. 
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Third, this thesis conceptualizes expatriates as “employees coming from an 
MNE’s headquarters or other entities and working in a foreign-country subsidiary of that 
MNE.” However, due to data limitations it operationalizes expatriates as employees in 
the foreign subsidiary coming from the Japanese MNE parent. By using this proxy 
measure this thesis could not identify expatriates coming from sister subsidiaries. 
Expatriates from different origins (e.g. countries other than Japan, headquarters, or sister 
subsidiaries) may have different governance effects on subsidiary performance. Future 
research may need to identify the different origins of expatriates and account for their 
differential governance effects on subsidiary performance. 
Fourth, this thesis studied only Japanese MNEs. Future research should replicate 
this study with data from numerous MNEs in a diverse set of cultures (e.g. U.S. MNEs, 
European MNEs, etc.) to ensure the wider generalizability of its findings. Japanese 
MNEs may have a unique governance structure, especially when they are parts of 
Keiretsus (Berglöf & Perotti, 1994). Future research needs to distinguish between 
Keiretsu and non-Keiretsu Japanese MNEs and this factor’s impact on their governance 
mechanisms and performance.  
Fifth, a foreign subsidiary’s purpose / mandate may influence its parent-
subsidiary governance mechanisms and performance (Birkinshaw, 1996; Schotter & 
Beamish, 2011b). For instance, the purpose / mandate of certain subsidiaries may not 
necessarily be to seek profits but to seek resources, two mandates that may influence 
parent-subsidiary governance and subsidiary survival / profitability differently. This 
thesis did not account for this ‘subsidiary purpose’ factor. Future research needs to 
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distinguish between the different subsidiary mandates and their effects on parent-
subsidiary governance and performance. 
Sixth, in this thesis risk orientation was measured as the sector-adjusted debt ratio 
in which the debt ratio was measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. This debt 
ratio measure has been previously used as a proxy measure of firm risk. Although it 
captures financial risk it does not necessarily capture other types of risk such as operating 
risk, political risk, etc. Future research may need to develop a more complex 
multidimensional risk measure that can more accurately capture a wider range of firm 
risks.  
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APPENDIX B: INTRODUCTION LETTER AND CONSENT FORM 
 
Introduction Letter: Subsidiary Governance of Foreign Multinationals 
 
Dear Mr. ____________, 
 
My name is Bassam Farah. I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Ivey Business School, 
Western University. As part of my doctoral thesis, I am working with my supervisor 
Professor Paul W. Beamish on a research study that investigates subsidiary governance 
mechanisms of multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
The purpose of this study is to better understand if and how subsidiary managers 
and/or directors influence subsidiary governance mechanisms. We are specifically 
interested in how expatriate staffing, ownership structures, and business risk play a role 
in the overall governance, and how this affects performance. We are confident that the 
results of our work will help to inform managers and directors at MNE foreign 
subsidiaries and headquarters about how to optimize governance structures. 
We believe that your company would be a good research site and that the results 
of our study would be interesting to you as an executive. Thus we are asking you to 
participate in this study. Once completed, we would of course share the aggregate results 
of the study with you, if you were interested. If you agree to participate in this study we 
would like to set up an appointment for a 45-minute interview. This interview could be 
conducted in person, but preferably by phone. Your name and the name of your 
organization will remain strictly anonymous throughout this study. Your participation is 
entirely voluntary and not compensated. You will be asked questions related to the above 
topic.  
In case you have any questions on the procedure for this study or your rights as a 
participant, please feel free to contact the supervisor for this study, Professor Paul W. 
Beamish (Phone: 519-661-3237; Email: pbeamish@ivey.ca) or the Office of Research 
Ethics, Western University (Phone: 519-661-3036; Email: ethics@uwo.ca). You can keep 
this letter for your record. Your signature on the consent form indicates your consent to 
participate in the study. During the interview you may choose not to answer any 
question(s), or withdraw from participating at any time. All collected information will be 
strictly confidential. This study does not involve any known risks. A total of 10-15 
individuals are expected to participate in this stage of the study. 
Please feel free to reach me at 661-771-6571 or at bfarah.phd@ivey.ca if you 
have any questions, and also if you would like a copy of the publications generated from 
this study. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Dr. Bassam Farah  PhD Psy, MA Psy, MBA 
Ph.D. Candidate International Business & Strategy 
Ivey Business School 
Western University 
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7 
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Office: 0N05D 
Office: 661-771-6571 
Mobile: 226-448-0610 
Email: bfarah.phd@ivey.ca 
 
 
Consent Form 
Research Project: Interviews on “Subsidiary Governance of Foreign Multinationals”. 
I have read the introduction letter, and agree to participate. All questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
Name:  
Signature: 
Date:  
I am interested in receiving the results of this study: YES/NO. 
 
 
Researcher: Bassam Farah 
Signature: 
Date:  
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Overarching Research Question(s): 
 
How do you influence the changes in your subsidiary’s governance mechanisms / 
structures, namely the use of expatriates, ownership, and risk? 
Why do you attempt to influence the changes in these governance mechanisms / 
structures (i.e. the use of expatriates, ownership, and risk) in your subsidiary? 
How does your parent use these governance mechanisms (i.e. ownership, expatriates, and 
risk) to govern your subsidiary? 
 
Interview Questions: 
 
Name: 
Position: 
Date started (and ended) position: 
Is the subsidiary manager an expatriate or not: yes or no 
Subsidiary location: 
1.  
1.1. How was your subsidiary set up in terms of ownership (i.e. nationality of owners, 
number of owners, number of shares for each owner, percentage of shares for each 
owner, etc.)? 
1.2. Why do you think was it set up that way? 
1.3. Who made these decisions (i.e. headquarters, regional headquarters, subsidiary, 
etc.)? 
1.4. Do you have any influence on these decisions? If so, what kind of influence? 
1.5. In the past, have you taken any initiative(s) to influence the changes in ownership 
in your subsidiary? If so, what were these initiatives? What were their outcomes? Why 
did you take them? 
1.6. In the future, how would you influence the changes in ownership in your 
subsidiary? And why? 
1.7. Do you believe you should have more or less influence on these decisions? Why, 
and in what way? 
1.8. How does your parent use ownership to govern your subsidiary? 
2.  
2.1. How was your subsidiary set up in terms of expatriates (i.e. nationality, number, 
percentage, positions, etc.)? 
2.2. Why do you think was it set up that way? 
2.3. Who made these decisions (i.e. headquarters, regional headquarters, subsidiary, 
etc.)? 
2.4. Do you have any influence on these decisions? If so, what kind of influence? 
2.5. In the past, have you taken any initiative(s) to influence the changes in expatriates 
in your subsidiary? If so, what were these initiatives? What were their outcomes? Why 
did you take them? 
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2.6. In the future, how would you influence the changes in expatriates in your 
subsidiary? And why? 
2.7. Do you believe you should have more or less influence on these decisions? Why, 
and in what way? 
2.8. How does your parent use expatriates to govern your subsidiary? 
3.  
3.1. How was your subsidiary set up in terms of risk guidelines [level of liquidity 
(liquidity ratio = current assets / current liabilities), level of (total) debt (debt ratio = total 
liabilities / total assets), level of interest coverage (times interest earned ratio = earnings 
before interest and tax / interest expense), credit terms, etc.]? 
3.2. Why do you think was it set up that way? 
3.3. Who made these decisions (i.e. headquarters, regional headquarters, subsidiary, 
etc.)? 
3.4. Do you have any influence on these decisions? If so, what kind of influence? 
3.5. In the past, have you taken any initiative(s) to influence the changes in risk 
orientation in your subsidiary? If so, what were these initiatives? What were their 
outcomes? Why did you take them? 
3.6. In the future, how would you influence the changes in risk orientation in your 
subsidiary? And why? 
3.7. Do you believe you should have more or less influence on these decisions? Why, 
and in what way? 
3.8. How does your parent use risk guidelines to govern your subsidiary? 
4.  
4.1. In your subsidiary, do you find evidence for or against the relationship between 
subsidiary governance (e.g. the use of ownership, expatriates, and risk) and subsidiary 
survival and / or profitability? What kind of evidence / relationship? Why do you think 
this evidence exists or does not exist? 
4.2. How (& why) do you think your subsidiary governance mechanisms (e.g. 
expatriates, ownership, risk orientation, etc.) affect your subsidiary’s survival and / or 
profitability? 
4.3. In your experience, which subsidiary governance mechanisms are most effective, 
why? 
5.  
5.1. How would you improve foreign subsidiary governance? 
5.2. Do you have any documents about your company that you can provide that may 
include relevant governance information that may be useful for this research? 
5.3. Is there anyone at headquarters who may be willing to give me a headquarters 
perspective on subsidiary governance? If so, please can you connect me with this person? 
5.4. Do you know any other subsidiary managers who may be willing to participate as 
an interviewee for this research? 
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